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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Appellant, Tracy Southwick (hereinafter 
"Southwick" or "Appellant"), the estate of Catherine J. Leone, formerly Catherine Southwick 
(hereinafter "Catherine Leone" or "Catherine")1, Respondents Frank Leone and Sam Leone, 
brothers of Catherine Leone, who were the co-guardians and co-conservators of Catherine 
Leone at the time of her death and at the relevant times described in this brief (hereinafter 
"the Leones"), and Christine Montoya, the daughter of Catherine Leone (hereinafter 
"Montoya"). 
1
 On January 16, 1991, Judge Scott Daniels granted an order changing the name of Catherine L. Southwick to 
her maiden name, Catherine J. Leone. (Record at pages 54-55, 164). Accordingly, while Appellant has continued to 
refer to the deceased as "Catherine Southwick" or "Mrs. Southwick" throughout this case and both appeals, 
Respondents have used, and will use throughout this brief, decedent's legal name. 
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Jurisdiction in this appeal is properly before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). The Supreme Court 
has assigned this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. Section 78-
2-2(4) (1953 as amended). 
V 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are essentially two issues raised on appeal: 
(a) Whether the trial court was in error in ruling that Frank Leone and Sam Leone 
were not "at fault" and therefore not personally liable to Appellant Southwick; and 
(b) Whether the trial court erred in determining that certain expenses, including co-
conservator fees, are legitimate expenses which could properly be deducted from a pay on 
death ("P.O.D.") account. 
Despite the mishmash of factual and legal issues Southwick has raised in his appeal, 
the questions on appeal are simply whether there was a sufficient factual basis for the trial 
court's rulings that: (a) the Leones were not personally liable to Southwick; and (b) certain 
expenses, including payments to the conservators, were legitimate. Southwick's appeal, 
therefore, is essentially an attack on the factual findings of the trial court, "which shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous" with "due regard given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses," Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 
1 
470 (Utah 1989). In reviewing factual findings, great deference is given to trial court 
findings. The facts are to be viewed favorable to the verdict of the trial court and where 
there is any reasonable support in the evidence for the verdict, it will not be disturbed on 
appeal. Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1975). 
Appellant argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that (a) certain 
expenses, including conservator fees, were legitimate and could be legally paid from the 
P.O.D. account; and (b) the Leones were not personally liable to Southwick for monies 
distributed to Christine Montoya. However, these issues involve questions of fact which 
should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous, which they are not. 
VI 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
The following statutory provision will be determinative on appeal with respect to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's ruling regarding the personal liability of 
the Leones: 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-429(2): 
(2) The conservator is individually liable for obligations arising from 
ownership or control of property of the estate or for torts committed in the 
course of administration of the estate only if he is personally at fault. 
[emphasis added]. 
OTHER RULES AND STATUTES WHICH MAY BE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Ann., § 75-3-803(1) 
Utah Code Ann., § 75-3-803(3)(b) 
Utah Code Ann., § 75-3-804 
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Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2 and 78-2-2(4) 
Utah Code Ann., § 75-5-417(1) 
Utah Code Ann., § 75-5-302(1) 
Utah Code Ann., § 75-5-306 
vn 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Leones are satisfied with Appellant's "Statement of the Case" as set forth in the 
Brief of Appellant, at pages 6-8 (exclusive of the Statement of Facts, which is set forth 
below), with the following qualifications and amplification: 
1. Appellant states that "After Mrs. Southwick's death, Mr. Southwick filed a 
claim for his share of the P.O.D. account on March 15, 1991. The Leones denied Mr. 
Southwick's claim and asked Judge Moffat to rule that Mr. Southwick had no interest in the 
P.O.D. account . . . Judge Moffat granted the Leones motions and Mr. Southwick appealed". 
Appellant's Brief, at 7. While this statement is correct, it is also true that Mr. Southwick's 
claim was made well over a year after he had resigned as the conservator of the estate of 
Catherine, given up control of the disputed funds which were to have been maintained by him 
in a pay on death account (referred by Southwick as "trust account"), and after obtaining a 
divorce from Catherine pursuant to a divorce complaint in which Southwick initially 
repudiated any interest in the P.O.D. account. (Record, pp. 139-140). These facts are very 
significant in this appeal in considering the "fault" or personal liability of the Leones. 
2. Appellant asserts on the bottom of page 7 of his appeal brief, that "Because the 
Leones had given the entire P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya while this case was on appeal to 
3 
this Court and while Mr. Southwick was awaiting a ruling on a motion to stay distribution of 
the funds of the P.O.D. account, which was ultimately granted, Mr. Southwick also asked the 
trial court to rule that the Leones were personally liable to Mr. Southwick . . . " In making 
these assertions, Southwick fails to point out that: (a) he waited over 14 weeks after Judge 
Moffat's ruling denying him an interest in the P.O.D. account, and over 2 months after the 
notice of appeal, to file a motion to stay distribution of the funds in the P.O.D. account; and 
(b) while the motion to stay was initially granted, long after funds had been disbursed to 
Christine Montoya, such motion was later denied expressly due to Appellant's failure to 
obtain a supersedeas bond. (Record, pp. 364-367). 
3. On page 8 of his brief, Southwick states that on September 27, 1994, Judge 
Rokich issued a memorandum decision in which he declared that "the Leones were not 
personally liable to Mr. Southwick for the funds from the P.O.D. account they gave to Ms. 
Montoya . . . " Appellant does not mention that the basis for such ruling by Judge Rokich 
was that the Leones relied on the trial court's earlier ruling when they distributed proceeds 
from the account. Specifically Judge Rokich ruled: "Pursuant to Judge Moffat's decision, the 
co-conservators [Leones] paid funds from the pay-on-death account to Catherine Montoya, 
the daughter of Catherine Southwick [Leone]." (Record, at unnumbered page between 618 
and 619). 
vn 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents offer the following statement of relevant facts in the present case: 
1. Catherine J. Leone (hereinafter "Catherine") married Appellant on March 22, 
1986 (Record, page 113, 139, 143). 
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2. Catherine suffered a cerebral hemorrhage in July, 1987, and was found to be 
legally incompetent by Honorable John A. Rokich, Third District Court, on March 2, 1988. 
(Record, page 28). 
3. On November 19, 1987, Southwick filed a petition with the trial court to be 
appointed as the guardian of Catherine. (Record, page 5-6). 
4. On or about January 29, 1988, Southwick; Frank Leone and Sam Leone, 
brothers of Catherine; Gilda Leone, mother of Catherine; Michael R. Sciumbato, attorney for 
the Leone family; and Noall T. Wooten, attorney for Appellant, entered into a Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement (the "Stipulation") concerning the guardianship and conservatorship of 
Catherine, and the disposition of her monies and property. (Record, pp. 19-22, 27). 
5. Based upon the Stipulation, on March 2, 1988, Judge Rokich signed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and an order, appointing Southwick as the general guardian and 
conservator of the estate of Catherine. (Record, pp. 27-30). In such order, Judge Rokich 
approved the Stipulation between the parties, and ordered that a pre-marital asset of 
Catherine's, a certificate of deposit held jointly with her mother, Gilda Leone, in the 
approximate sum of $40,000, be placed into a "separate, liquid, interest-bearing, federally-
insured account" with "Tracy Southwick, spouse of the protected person, and Sam Leone, 
brother of the protected person, as joint co-signatories of said account." (Record, page 29). 
The order further provides: 
[Appellant and Sam Leone] shall make distributions from said to pay medical 
expenses incurred for the benefit of the protected person, and to pay other 
expenses incurred for the necessary support and maintenance of the protected 
person. . . 
5 
Catherine Montoya, the daughter of the above-named protected person, and 
Tracy Southwick, the spouse of the protected person, shall be named as the 
pay-on-death beneficiaries of said account, each to share equally. 
(Record, pp. 29-30). 
6. On October 2, 1989, or approximately eighteen months after Judge Rokich's 
order regarding the $40,000 account of Catherine's, Appellant filed an original Complaint of 
Divorce (the "original complaint") from Catherine in the Third Judicial District Court, before 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian. Appellant had Catherine personally served at the Zions Care 
Center in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Record, pp. 139-141). The Leones and the Leone family 
were aware of the original complaint. (Record, page 105). In paragraph 8 of the original 
complaint there is a provision in which Appellant expressly relinquishes any and all claims to 
the P.O.D. account, stating as follows: 
8. That each of the parties brought various items of personal property into 
the marriage specifically the defendant has a savings account of approximately 
$45,000 and it is reasonable that each party be awarded all of those items of 
personal property that they brought into the marriage including but not limited 
to the defendant being awarded the aforesaid savings account. [P.O.D. 
Account], 
[emphasis added]. (Record, pp. 139-140). 
7. On December 4, 1989, Appellant filed a petition seeking to have his 
guardianship and conservatorship terminated, and to have the Leones, brothers of Catherine, 
appointed as the joint guardians and co-conservators. (Record, pp. 39-40). On January 9, 
1990, Judge James Sawaya entered an order terminating Appellant's guardianship and 
conservatorship, and appointing the Leones as the co-guardians and co-conservators of 
Catherine and her estate. (Record, pp. 50-51). The Leones filed a consent to their 
appointment as co-guardians and co-conservators on December 11, 1989. (Record, page 35). 
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8. On December 6, 1989, a few weeks prior to being relieved of his duties as 
guardian and conservator, Appellant delivered to Sam Leone, as the co-conservator, an 
executed document entitled "Guardian Transfer Funds Receipt," whereby Appellant certified 
that he had "endorsed and signed over to Sam Leone the funds in the amount of $46,242.74 
that was held in trust for Catherine Southwick," and absolving Appellant of "any future 
accounting or other obligations that may arise from the transfer of the funds." [emphasis 
added]. (Record, page 218). 
9. On December 13, 1989, less than one month prior to being relieved of his 
duties as guardian and conservator, Appellant filed an amended complaint in his divorce from 
Catherine. (Record, pp. 143-145). The amended complaint is identical to the original 
complaint, except for paragraph 8 which addressed the P.O.D. account, which was revised as 
follows: 
That each of the parties brought various items of personal property into the 
marriage and it is reasonable that each party be awarded all of those items of 
personal property that they brought into the marriage. 
(Record, page 144). Neither the original complaint nor the amended complaint make any 
mention of the fact that Catherine was incompetent or a protected person, or that her affairs 
were the subject of a guardianship and conservatorship. (Record, pp. 143-145; 139-140). 
Despite Appellant's knowledge that Catherine was incompetent, Appellant did not provide the 
Leones or any Leone family member with a copy of the amended complaint. Incredibly, 
Southwick served Catherine, an incompetent, by mailing the amended complaint to her at 
Zions Care Center. (Record, pp. 105, 143-145). 
7 
10. On January 9, 1990, a default divorce from Catherine was granted. The 
divorce decree incorporated the language and terms contained in the amended complaint. 
Such divorce decree was also served on Catherine by mail to Zions Care Center. (Record, 
pp. 152-155). 
11. Catherine died on January 25, 1991. (Record, page 98). 
12. On March 15, 1991, Appellant filed a Demand for Accounting and Payment of 
Proceeds, demanding that the Leones, as co-guardians and co-conservators of the estate of 
Catherine, provide an accounting of the "use and distribution of the funds" of the "Trust 
Account of, and for the benefit of Catherine" and "payment of his half of the remaining funds 
of the Trust account." (Record, pp. 56-57). 
13. On April 10, 1991, the Leones, through counsel, denied Appellant's claim. 
(Record, page 83). On May 2, 1991, the Leones filed a motion and supporting memorandum, 
seeking a determination by the trial court of, among other matters, Appellant's rights with 
respect to the estate of Catherine and, specifically, the funds which were the subject of the 
trial court's order of March 2, 1989, requiring the establishment of a P.O.D. account. 
(Record, page 96-117; exhibits to supporting memorandum at pp. 96-117). 
14. Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the Leones1 motions. (Record, 
pp. 169-182; exhibits to memorandum at pp. 183-193). The Leones submitted a reply 
memorandum on May 21, 1991. (Record, pp. 211-218). 
15. On July 16, 1991, Judge Richard Moffat entered a minute entry denying, 
among other things, Appellant's claim to one-half of the P.O.D. account. (Record, pp. 224-
8 
225). An order denying Appellant's claim to the P.O.D. account was signed by Judge Moffat 
on July 31, 1991. (Record, pp. 227-228). 
16. On August 28, 1991, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. (Record, page 237). 
17. On October 30, 1991, approximately 14 weeks after Judge Moffat's minute 
entry denying Appellant's claim to a part of the P.O.D. account, and over 2 months after the 
notice of appeal, Appellant filed a motion for stay, seeking an order staying distribution of the 
funds in the P.O.D. account. (Record, page 253-258). Such motion was granted on 
February 7, 1992 by minute entry of Judge Moffat, and later denied in a ruling dated May 12, 
1992. (Record, pp. 272, 367). 
18. On or about December 14, 1991, upon advice of counsel and pursuant to Judge 
Moffat's rulings, the Leones distributed to Christine Montoya, daughter of Catherine, the sum 
of $36,692.51, representing the remaining sums in the account. (Record, page 327, page 
unnumbered between 618 and 619). 
19. On March 30, 1991, Appellant filed a Motion for Clarification of Judge 
Moffat's memorandum decision dated July 16, 1991, and order dated July 31, 1991. (Record, 
page 250). In response to such motion, Judge Moffat heard oral argument on February 7, 
1992. (Record, page 269). 
20. On March 11, 1992, Judge Moffat signed a Minute Entry further clarifying his 
previous rulings. In such Minute Entry, Judge Moffat again concluded that Southwick had no 
claim with respect to P.O.D. account: 
Further, this Court follows its previous findings that Tracy Southwick has no 
interest in the Estate of or monies owned by Catherine J. Leone (hereinafter 
Catherine) on the date of her death. Southwick contends that he is entitled to 
such proceeds by virtue of a Stipulation and Settlement Agreement entered into 
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by Gilda Leone, Catherine1 mother, Catherine K. Montoya, Catherine's daughter 
and only child, Sam Leone, Brother of Catherine and current co-conservator of 
the estate, Southwick, and Michael R. Sciumbato, Attorney for Leone family, 
and Noall T. Wooten, Attorney for Southwick, and signed by the parties on 
various days in January, 1988. The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement were 
incorporated into Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of 
Appointment of Guardian and Conservator as signed by the Honorable John A. 
Rokich on March 2, 1988. 
That said Stipulation and Order stated that approximately $40,000 owned by 
Catherine were not to be considered as part of her estate. . . . 
This Court finds that Southwick, as a condition precedent to receiving these 
funds of Catherine's, was to be her lawfully wedded spouse at the time of her 
death. The Order of March 2, 1988 reflects such fact. Southwick, by 
obtaining a divorce from Catherine while he was Guardian/Conservator over 
her in her incapacitated state, cut off all right and claims he had against any 
monies or properties Catherine owned at the date of her death. 
Wherefore, this Court is of the opinion that its Minute Entry of July 16, 1991, 
was correct in its conclusions that Southwick had no claim against any monies 
owned by Catherine at the time of her death as Southwick had obtained a 
divorce from Catherine one year prior to her death. . . 
(Record, pp. 317-321). These findings were reiterated in an additional minute order of Judge 
Moffat dated May 12, 1992. In such minute order, Judge Moffat also denied Appellant's 
motion for a stay of distribution of the proceeds from the P.O.D. account, based on the fact 
that Appellant had not posted a supersedeas bond pending the appeal. (Record, pp. 364-367). 
21. On September 21, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision, 
reversing the order of Judge Moffat denying Appellant an interest in the P.O.D. account, and 
a nunc pro tunc order of Judge Moffat allowing the co-conservators to change the beneficiary 
on a life insurance policy. The case was remanded for the entry of appropriate orders. 
(Record, pp. 372-382). 
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22. On August 5, 1994, an evidentiary hearing was held before Judge John A. 
Rokich, to determine Appellants share of the P.O.D. account, and other related issues, 
including the liability of the Leones to Appellant. (Record, page 553, 563; transcript, pp. 
744-865). 
23. At the hearing before Judge Rokich on August 5, 1994, Sam Leone testified 
that the decision to disburse the funds from the P.O.D. account was based on "advice of 
counsel" and "Judge Moffat's decision." (Record, at 805, 847, 852-853, 858). He further 
testified that it was the Leones' understanding based on Judge Moffat's ruling and advice of 
counsel that "Southwick had absolutely no claim" to the P.O.D. account, and the Leones had 
"absolutely no reason to believe" that the distribution to Ms. Montoya of the P.O.D. monies 
in accordance with Judge Moffat's ruling was "incorrect or illegal." (Record, at 852-853). 
24. At the August 5, 1994 hearing, Sam Leone further testified that, at a meeting 
with Appellant and Sam Leone prior to Appellant's termination as conservator and transfer of 
funds, Appellant informed the Leones that he "wanted to get a divorce [from Catherine] and 
to transfer these responsibilities" to the Leones and insisted that "whatever he brought into the 
marriage was his and whatever [Catherine Leone] brought into the marriage was hers." 
(Record, at pp. 72-73). In addition, Sam Leone testified that after Southwick terminated his 
conservatorship and initiated divorce proceedings, Appellant took the other assets or Catherine 
Southwick and, in Sam Leone's words "left her" and "abandoned her," resulting in the Leone 
family's decision to change Catherine's name back to her maiden name (Record, at page 782 
and 788). 
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25. Mr. Southwick was not present at the August 5, 1995 hearing, and has 
provided absolutely no testimony in this case. (Record, page 110). 
26. On September 27, 1994, Judge Rokich issued a memorandum decision in which 
he found as follows: 
(a) The Leones, co-conservators, were not personally liable to Appellant for amounts 
distributed to Christine Montoya from the P.O.D. account, as they paid the sums to Christine 
Montoya "pursuant to Judge Moffat's ruling." (Record, unnumbered paragraph between 618 
and 619). 
(b) The sum of $14,460.65 in expenses claimed by the Leones, were legitimate 
expenses for the care of Catherine and could be deducted from the P.O.D. account, and the 
sum of $3,622.73 in expenses claimed by the Leones as expenses incurred on behalf of 
Catherine, could not be deducted from the P.O.D. account. (Record, page 619). 
(c) Appellant was entitled to one-half of the P.O.D. account, in the sum of 
$20,337.24, together with interest on such amount from the date of Catherine's death. 
(Record, page 620). 
(d) Appellant was granted judgment against the Leones, in the amount of $1,811.50, 
representing one-half of certain disallowed expenses which could not be paid from the P.O.D. 
account, together with interest from the date of Catherine's death. (Record, page 620). 
(e) Appellant was granted judgment against Christine Montoya in the sum of 
$20,337.24, representing Appellant's one-half of the P.O.D. account to which he was entitled, 
together with interest from the date of Catherine's death. (Record, page 620). 
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27. On May 19, 1995, after several months of reviewing, filing objections to, and 
hearings regarding, proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment submitted to 
the court, Judge Bohling, Judge Rokich's successor, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment dated May 19, 1995. (Record, pp. 659, 673, 693, 675-688, 693, 694, 
700). In such Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Judge Bohling, reiterated 
the findings of Judge Rokich as articulated in his memorandum opinion dated September 24, 
1994, and further found that the claim for attorney's fees of William Hadley, the estate's 
counsel, was denied as a matter of law. (Record, pp. 694-699). 
28. On June 15, 1995, Appellant filed his second notice of appeal. (Record, page 
707). 
29. As the brothers and co-conservators of Catherine Leone, from January 1, 1990 
until Catherine's death, the Leones devoted hundreds of hours of their time to the care and 
support of their sister Catherine. (Record, pp. 274-294). 
30. In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment dated May 19, 
1995, entered by Judge Bohling (Record, page 694), Appellant was granted judgment against 
Christine Montoya, the recipient of the entire amount of the monies in the P.O.D. account, in 
the amount of $20,337.72. (Record, page 698). Appellant has not pursued any formal 
collection proceedings against Montoya. 
31. Appellant never obtained a supersedeas bond following his initial appeal in this 
matter (Record, page 813). 
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IX 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant incorrectly contends that the trial erred "as a matter of law" in concluding 
that the Leones were not personally liable to Southwick for his share of the P.O.D. account. 
Such assertion is based on the claim that the Leones had no legal authority to use or disburse 
the P.O.D. funds. Appellant brings his claim against the Leones in their capacity as the co-
conservators of the estate of Catherine. In order for the Leones to be found personally liable, 
there must be a finding under Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-429 that, as co-conservators, they 
were "personally at fault." The issue of liability of a conservator or guardian is governed by 
traditional rules with respect to trustees, which require a finding of negligence or a breach of 
the "reasonable man" standard to impose liability. Therefore, the question as to the liability 
of the Leones involves issues of fact, not issues of law, as claimed by Appellant. 
In concluding that the Leones were not personally liable, the trial court considered 
both the documentary evidence in the record, and the testimony of Sam Leone taken at a 
hearing on August 5, 1994. The trial court had a great deal of substantial evidence to support 
its ruling that the Leones were not personally liable. The court's ruling was specifically based 
on the finding that the funds were disbursed to Montoya "pursuant to Judge Moffat's ruling." 
The testimony of Sam Leone, as well as the documentary evidence in the record, provides 
substantial support that the Leones did not breach the standard of care: (a) that the Leones 
sought appropriate instructions from the court immediately after Southwick asserted a claim to 
the P.O.D. account; (a) that the Leones did not disburse funds from the account until 
receiving rulings from the trial court; and (c) the Leones reasonably believed, based on their 
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course of dealings with Southwick, advice of counsel, and the rulings of Judge Moffat, that 
Southwick had no claim to the P.O.D. funds. Similarly, the Leones did not convert the 
P.O.D. account (if conversion is considered to constitute "fault" under the above-referenced 
statute), and did not act without "authority", as claimed by Appellant, as they were acting 
appropriately and pursuant to instructions and authorization from the trial court. 
Appellant also claims that the trial court was in error in deducting certain expenses, 
including a burial plot, burial expenses, co-conservator fees, costs of a television and antenna, 
and court costs from the P.O.D. account in determining Southwick's share of such account. 
These expenses, which were all incurred prior to the death of Catherine, were properly 
determined by the trial court to be necessary for Catherine's support and maintenance. The 
burial and television costs were paid prior to Catherine' death. The trial court, which based 
its ruling with respect to such costs on the testimony of Sam Leone at a hearing on August 5, 
1994 (discussed in detail in the argument below), is in a much better position than Southwick, 
who abandoned Catherine long before her death, to determine whether such costs were 
necessary for Catherine's support and maintenance. The conservator fee awarded to the 
Leones were proper, based on the substantial time devoted by them to their sister, and are not 
time-barred because a request for conservator fees was presented timely to the estate's 
representative. 
In advancing his arguments, Appellant has consistently failed to marshall the evidence 
which supports the findings and ruling of the trial court, and to demonstrate that despite such 
evidence, the trial court's rulings are clearly erroneous. Having failed to do so, the trial 





APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE AND DEMONSTRATING THAT DESPITE SUCH 
EVIDENCE, THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court, prior to this most recent appeal, entered a number of findings which 
formed the basis for its conclusions of law. Such findings of fact were, in turn, based on the 
testimony presented at a hearing of the trial court held on August 5, 1994 (Record, beginning 
at page 744), as well as documentary evidence in this matter. The trial court's findings 
should be reviewed consistent with the requirements of Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, amended in January, 1987, which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Rule 52: Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . , the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; . . . Findings of 
Fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the 
close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed 
by the court . . . 
[Emphasis added by Order of Utah Supreme Court on October 30, 1986, effective January 1, 
1987]. 
A simple analysis of the January, 1987 modification to Rule 52(a) clearly demonstrates 
an intent to avoid the retrying of the factual issues of a case at the appellate level. The 
standard of review is well established - the facts are viewed favorable to the verdict and 
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where there is any reasonable basis in the evidence for the verdict, it will not be disturbed on 
appeal. Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, at 902 (Utah 1975). 
Factual findings of the trial court, "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous" with "due 
regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 
470 (Utah 1989); Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). On appeal from a 
judgment of a trial court, the appellate court's role "is not to substitute [its] own findings for 
those of the Trial Court, but to examine the record for evidence supporting the judgment." 
Shioii v. Shioii, 712 P.2d 197, at 201 (Utah 1985). 
In attacking a trial court's ruling, an Appellant's burden is well established - he must 
marshall all of the evidence supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support 
it. Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987); Harker v. 
Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah App. 1987). As this Court stated in 
Riche v. Riche, supra: 
Husband, in his brief on appeal, refers this court to evidence which conflicts 
with the trial court's findings and supports his contention that he should have 
been awarded custody of the four children. However, Husband does not 
"marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). See 
also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Harker v. 
Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Therefore, we decline to further consider Husband's attack on the court's 
findings as to custody. 
(Riche, supra p. 468). [Emphasis added]. 
17 
Applying the clear appellate standard discussed above, it was incumbent upon 
Appellant to marshall all of the evidence which supports the trial court's findings of fact, and, 
demonstrate that despite such evidence the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to 
be against the clear weight of the evidence. As will be seen below, Appellant has failed to 
meet that standard. 
In the instant case, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in (a) allowing certain 
expenses for Catherine's necessary support and maintenance, which, consequently, resulted in 
a miscalculation of the amount of Appellant's share of the P.O.D. account; (b) granting to the 
Leones conservator fees; and (c) concluding that the Leones were not personally liable to 
Southwick for the monies disbursed to Christine Montoya. In making these claims, Appellant 
is attacking the factual findings of the trial court, as will be more fully discussed in the 
sections below. However, Appellant has clearly failed to meet the standard of review, 
discussed above, in that he has not marshalled all of the evidence which was presented to the 
trial court, nor has he made an attempt, based on all such evidence, to evaluate the trial 
court's reasoning or demonstrate that such reasoning was clearly erroneous. 
Because Appellant has failed to meet the required standard, this Court should not 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE LEONES WERE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO 
SOUTHWICK FOR HIS SHARE OF THE P.O.D. ACCOUNT 
DISBURSED TO CHRISTINE MONTOYA 
Without bothering to address the applicable statutory sections in the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code which define the liability of conservators, Southwick asserts in Point V of his 
argument (page 23), without any legal or factual support, that "the trial court erred as a matter 
of law in concluding that the Leones were not personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his 
share of the P.O.D. account . . . " Appellant acknowledges that his claim against the Leones 
is based on the Leones' position, or acts undertaken by the Leones in their capacity, as "co-
guardians/co-conservators" of Mrs. Southwick.2 (See pages 24-25 of Appellant's Brief). 
"FauItVNegligence Standard 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, § 75-5-429, defines the standard for determining 
individual liability of conservators), and provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) The conservator is individually liable for obligations arising from 
ownership or control of property of the estate or for torts committed in 
the course of administration of the estate only if he is personally at fault. 
[emphasis added]. 
interestingly, while Appellant asserts that (a) the P.O.D. account was not part of the estate of Catherine, (b) 
the conservatorship terminated on Catherine's death, and (c) the conservators are liable because they acted 
outside their authority as conservators and guardians, Appellant has elected to assert his claims against the 
Leones, as conservators, in this probate action, instead of a separate civil action. In an interesting exchange in 
the hearing on August 5, 1994, Judge Rokich suggests that, since the P.O.D. account is not part of the estate, 
"Mr. Southwick had a claim against whoever withheld the funds in some type of civil action, not really a probate 
action", and that the claim against the Leones does not fall "within the probate code". Counsel for Southwick 
responded by indicating that since a "conservator has the obligation to pay over upon the death the P.O.D. 
account. . .," Southwick "filed the claim to them as conservators . . ." (See Record, pp. 848-849). 
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It is well settled that a guardian or a conservator is a trustee and is governed by the 
same rules that govern other trustees. As such, a guardian or conservator is required to bear 
the loss if he has been guilty of negligence "in keeping, caring for, or disposing of the ward's 
property . . ." 39 Am Jur 2d Guardian and Ward, § 187. 
Similarly, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, § 75-5-417(1), provides that a 
conservator "shall act as a fiduciary and shall observe the standards of care as set forth in 
Section 75-7-302," relating to trustees. In defining this standard of care, §75-7-302(1) 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2), a trustee who invests and 
manages trust assets owes a duty to the beneficiaries of the trust to comply 
with the prudent investor rule as set forth in this section, [emphasis added]. 
In defining the personal liability of trustees to third parties, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-
306, provides (in substantially similar language to § 75-5-429 pertaining to conservators, set 
forth above), in pertinent part as follows: 
(2) A trustee is personally liable for obligations arising from ownership or 
control of property of the trust estate or for torts committed in the course of 
administration of the trust estate only if he is personally at fault, [emphasis 
added]. 
A trustee owes a duty to exercise reasonable care. George C. Bogert and George T. 
Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, (2d Edition), § 541. Thus, based on the above 
statutory authority, it is clear that the standard for determining the liability of the Leones is a 
negligence standard, or a "prudent man" or "reasonable man" standard. Consequently, 
contrary to the suggestions and conclusionary statements of Appellant, a conservator is not 
strictly liable for his conduct, as no reasonable individual would serve in such capacity if 
conservators were held to such a high standard. The only question to be considered, 
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therefore, is whether the trial court had a sufficient factual or evidentiary basis for concluding 
that the Leones were not liable or "at fault". If such evidence exists, the trial court's ruling 
should not be disturbed. 
Following the August 5, 1994, the trial court considered all of the evidence presented 
in testimony at the hearing, as well as the documentary evidence in the record, and made a 
specific ruling that the Leones were not "personally liable" to Mr. Southwick. Such ruling 
was based on a specific finding by Judge Rokich that "The co-conservators paid the funds to 
Catherine Montoya pursuant to Judge Moffat's ruling." (See Record, unnumbered page 
following page 618; 698).3 
A review of the record reveals that there is a great deal of evidence to support the trial 
court's ruling that the Leones are not personally liable. A summary of portions of the 
evidence which have a direct bearing on the issue as to whether the Leones were "at fault" or 
negligent, is set forth below: 
1. On January 9, 1990, the trial court terminated Appellant's guardianship and 
conservatorship of Catherine following the petition of Appellant. The Leones were appointed 
as the co-guardians and co-conservators of Catherine. (Record, 39-40; 50-51). In 
connection with Appellant's efforts to terminate his guardianship and conservatorship, 
Appellant delivered to Sam Leone a document entitled "Guardian Transfer Funds Receipt" 
pursuant to which Appellant delivered to Sam Leone the "amount of $46,242.74 that was held 
in trust for Catherine Southwick. . . " [emphasis added]. (Record, page 218). Appellant did 
At the August 5, 1994 hearing, Judge Rokich acknowledged that he would be considering issues of 
whether the Leones were negligent or breached their fiduciary duty, in assessing the liability of the Leones. (See 
Record, page 816, 844). 
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not take any action to remain a co-signatory on the account, and did not participate in 
making any further distributions from the account for the benefit of Catherine, as required in 
the original Stipulation and related Order. (Record, pp. 20, 29). Most importantly, he did not 
indicate then or at any time prior to Catherine's death, that he was making any claim to the 
money in the P.O.D. account, and as indicated below, took action directly contrary to such 
position. 
2. At a meeting between Southwick and Sam Leone prior to Southwickfs 
termination as conservator, Southwick indicated to Sam Leone that he wanted to get a divorce 
from Catherine, and that "whatever he brought into the marriage was his and whatever 
[Catherine] brought into the marriage was hers." (Record, page 72-73). 
3. In October 1989, Southwick filed a divorce complaint against Catherine, in 
which he expressly disclaimed any interest in the P.O.D. account. (Record, page 139-140). 
While this complaint was seen by the Leones, an amended complaint, which removed the 
reference to the P.O.D. account, filed on December 13, 1989, or shortly after Southwick 
transfers funds to the Leones, was served by mail to Catherine (who Southwick knew was 
incompetent) at her rest home, and no copy was provided to the Leones or Leone family.4 
In a Reply Brief submitted to this Court in Appellant's earlier appeal, Appellant acknowledges that the 
record reflects no service of the amended complaint on the Leones, but asserts that he and his counsel will testify 
that "a copy of the Amended complaint was mailed to Appellees and that Appellees were fully aware of the 
change to paragraph 8, the reasons for the change, and that the Appellee's consented to the change". (See 
Appellant's Reply Brief dated October 25, 1992). Although three and a half years and numerous court 
proceedings have elapsed since this submittal, the fact remains that appellant improperly mailed the amended 
complaint to Catherine (knowing she was an incapacitated person) at her rest home, and there is no evidence in 
the record that appellant put the Leones on notice of this very important change in the terms of the divorce. 
Quite to the contrary, in a billing request submitted by Frank Leone, he indicates that on January 3, 1990, he 
contacted counsel for Southwick to request a final draft of the divorce decree, only to find out that the divorce 
was final! Mr. Leone's records also reflect a meeting with Zion's Nursing Home to determine why the home 
retained divorce documents delivered to the home, without notifying the family. (Record, page 277, 278). 
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(Record, pp. 105; 139-141; 143-145). Accordingly, the Leones were justifiably left with the 
impression that "whatever Catherine brought into the marriage", including the funds from the 
P.O.D. account, were part of Catherine's estate, and that Appellant was making no claim to 
the contrary. 
4. After his termination as conservator, and his divorce from Catherine, 
Southwick took the other assets of Catherine and "abandoned" Catherine. Then, after her 
death, he immediately returned to the scene (on March 11, 1991, or less than two months 
after Catherine's death), and demanded an accounting and distribution of funds of the "Trust 
Account of, and for the benefit of Catherine" and payment of his one-half of the P.O.D. 
account. (Record, pp. 56-57). Upon receiving such demand, the Leones denied Southwick's 
claim and shortly thereafter sought instruction and a determination from the trial court as to 
what rights, if any, Southwick had with respect to the P.O.D. account. (Record, pp. 55-57; 
83; and 96-117). 
5. Following submittals by the parties, Judge Moffat entered a minute entry 
denying Appellant's claim to the P.O.D. account, and allowing the conservators to change the 
beneficiaries of Catherine's estate to Montoya, or Montoya and Catherine's mother. An 
additional order denying Appellant's claim was entered on July 31, 1991. On March 30, 
1992, and again on May 12, 1992, Judge Moffat signed additional orders, expressly denying 
Appellant's claim to the P.O.D. account. (Record, pp. 224-225; 227-228; 317-321; and 364-
367). 
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6. On December 14, 1991, upon advice of counsel and in reliance upon Judge 
Moffat's rulings, the Leones disbursed the remaining funds in the account to Christine 
Montoya. (Record, page 327). 
7. Sam Leone testified that, based on Judge Moffat's rulings, it was the 
understanding of the Leones that the only party with a claim to the monies in the account, 
was Christine Montoya. (Record, page 853). He further testified that at the time of the 
distribution of the funds to Christine Montoya, he had no reason to believe that he could not 
make such distribution. (Record, page 854). 
In view of this evidence, there is no question that the trial court had a sufficient basis 
for finding that the Leones were not "at fault" and not personally liable. The evidence clearly 
suggests that the Leones had a reasonable basis for believing that Southwick had - at the time 
he initiated divorce proceedings, terminated his duties as conservator, and abandoned his 
duties under the Stipulation as co-signatory and co-participant in disbursing funds -
relinquished any claim he had to the P.O.D. account. This is explicitly evidenced by 
Southwick's execution of a document, relinquishing control of such funds "that was held in 
trust for Catherine Southwick," clearly implying to the Leones that Southwick was asserting 
no continuing claim to this account. Southwick's express disavowal of any rights to the 
P.O.D. account in paragraph 8 of the original divorce complaint, further supports the Leones' 
belief that he had no claim to such funds. Common sense further supports such a belief, 
since the monies were after all, originally Catherine's, not Southwick's. 
Appellant has previously argued that the change in the divorce complaint does not 
support a claim by the Leones that Southwick acted improperly, because Southwick was 
24 
simply following a previous order of Judge Rokich establishing the P.O.D. account. (See 
Appellant's Reply Brief in Initial Appeal, pp. 8-10). Such a claim ignores the indisputable 
fact that the initial divorce complaint (in which Southwick disclaims any interest in the 
P.O.D. account) was filed long after the Stipulation and Judge Rokich's related order. 
Moreover, there is no question that Southwick had the authority (notwithstanding Judge 
Rokich's ruling) to relinquish any claim to the P.O.D. account as part of the terms of the 
divorce, precisely what he did in the initial complaint (the only complaint of which the 
Leones were aware). Finally, Southwick provides no explanation as to why the divorce 
complaints did not mention that Catherine was an incompetent person, or why the amended 
complaint was not served on the Leones, which would have enabled the Leone family, as 
Catherine's representatives, to fairly address the property division issues in the divorce prior 
to entry of a default. 
At the time Southwick re-appeared and made a claim to the P.O.D. account following 
Catherine's death, the Leones acted promptly and reasonably in immediately seeking direction 
from the Court. Only after express rulings by the trial court that Southwick had no interest in 
Catherine's estate and the P.O.D. account, and after receiving advice of counsel, did the 
Leones distribute the P.O.D. funds to Christine Montoya. 
In the instant case, the Leones, as co-conservators, had a duty, as pointed out by 
Appellant, to deliver, or disburse, the P.O.D. account, to the party or parties who were the 
beneficiaries of the account. In this case, based on the evidence described above, and after 
seeking instruction from the trial court, the Leones were simply attempting to carry out their 
duties by delivering the proceeds of the account to Christine Montoya, who the Leones 
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believed, based on their dealings with Southwick, on advice of counsel and orders of the trial 
court denying Southwick's claim to the account, was the only person entitled to such funds. 
As conservators, the Leones' duties extended to Ms. Montoya who certainly had an 
expectation that the Leones would promptly disburse the funds to which she was entitled. 
Under the law of trusts, which is applicable to the Leones as co-conservators, courts 
in the exercise of their jurisdiction over the administration of trusts, customarily provide 
instructions to trustees, at their request or application, as to their duties and powers. Bogert, 
The Law of Trusts and Trustees, infra § 259, at 406. A trustee is entitled to rely on 
instructions of the court as a protection in the performance of his duties, supra at 407. The 
trustee is entitled to the instructions of the court as to the extent of his powers and duties, as 
to who are beneficiaries under the trust, supra, at 408. 
A trustee does not ordinarily commit a breach of trust if he does not intentionally or 
negligently do something which he should not do, or fails to do something he ought to do. In 
addition, a trustee does not ordinarily commit a breach of trust unless he is in some way 
personally at fault. Austin Wakeman Scott, Scott on Trusts, (4th Edition), § 201, at 219-220. 
A trustee is under a duty in administering a trust to exercise such care and skill as a person of 
ordinary prudence would exercise, supra, at 220. While a trustee may in certain situations be 
held liable for breach of trust even though he has not intentionally committed a breach of 
trust or been negligent, the trustee can protect himself by making payments under the 
authority of the court which has jurisdiction over the administration of the trust, supra at 220. 
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In the instant case, it is uncontroverted that the Leones disbursed the monies to 
Montoya based on advice of counsel and the trial court's rulings. A trustee can escape 
liability involving a mistake of law due to advice of counsel by simply submitting the matter 
to the court for its instructions. The Leones did just that. 
In the present case, the trial court had sufficient evidence to conclude that the Leones 
exercised reasonable care by immediately submitting the issue of Southwick's claim to the 
P.O.D. account to the trial court for instructions, and following the rulings of the trial court 
and the advice of counsel. The Leones reasonably relied on the legal expertise of the court 
and counsel in attempting to carry out their duties. 
The trial court's ruling that the Leones are not personally liable was based on an 
express finding that the Leones acted only after (i) carefully considering the legalities; (ii) 
after the entry of the trial court's ruling; and (iii) in a manner strictly in accordance with that 
ruling. 
As indicated above, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial 
court's ruling. However, Appellant has failed to engage in a point by point examination of 
the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling. He must show that there is no support in the 
evidence for such ruling. Appellant has, instead, focussed on self-serving conclusionary 
language to the effect that the Leones acted in "an unauthorized and unlawful manner;" "did 
not have authority to use the assets [of Catherine] after her death" or to "invade the P.O.D. 
account or to transfer funds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya;" "commingled funds of 
the P.O.D. account" and "misused the funds;" "violated their fiduciary duty" and are 
personally liable for Southwick's "share of the P.O.D. account which the Leones squandered, 
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converted and/or disposed of." (See pages 23-24 of Appellant's Brief). In reality, the record 
supports none of these conclusions, and there has been no findings with respect to these 
unsupported claims. 
In fact, the record is quite clear that (a) the Leones derived no personal benefit despite 
the hundreds of hours they devoted to their sister, (b) none of the protected assets were 
wasted, and (c) all of the funds to which Southwick made a claim were in the account at the 
time of the disbursement to Montoya. 
Contrary to Southwick's assertions, the funds were disbursed by the Leones to 
Montoya with fuH authority, based on a court order of Judge Moffat. While the P.O.D. 
account was later determined by the Court of Appeals to be owned one-half by Southwick, 
the Leones acted lawfully and with full authority at the time they disbursed the funds to 
Montoya pursuant to Judge Moffat's ruling. Appellant's characterization of the Leones1 
actions as unlawful and unauthorized further demonstrates Appellant's willingness to ignore 
the record in this matter.5 Similarly, Southwick's attempts to impugn the character of the 
Leones by charging that they commingled funds and squandered, converted and disposed of 
Southwick's share of the P.O.D. account, is designed to take focus away from the essential 
issue as to whether the Leones were "at fault," addressed above. 
Applying traditional concepts of negligence law, it would seem to be both 
impracticable and inequitable to assess the "fault" of the Leones, without also analyzing the 
5In support of this position, in the August 5, 1994 hearing, Judge Rokich states: "But as of the time the 
parties acted on an order signed by a Judge, the fact that Judge is reversed doesn't mean that the parties were not 
acting in the scope of their authority at the time they acted." (Record, page 812). 
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comparative conduct of Southwick.6 Southwick should be held at least substantially 
responsible for relinquishing control of the P.O.D. funds, contrary to the terms of the 
Stipulation which required him to be a co-signatory and participant in making disbursements 
on behalf of Catherine. Had Southwick continued as a co-signatory of the P.O.D. account as 
required by the Stipulation and related order, the conduct of the Leones of which Southwick 
has complained would presumably not have ever occurred. Further, Southwick should have 
known, or reasonably anticipated, that the Leones would be justifiably misled in believing that 
Southwick had relinquished any claim to the P.O.D. account, in view of his actions in turning 
over the P.O.D. funds that "was held in trust for Catherine Southwick"; by his initial divorce 
complaint in which he disavowed any claim to the P.O.D. account; and by his statement to 
Sam Leone that he wanted to be divorced and that "whatever she brought into the marriage 
was hers." Southwick further contributed to this belief and subsequent actions of the Leones 
by "abandoning" Catherine and failing to communicate with the Leones regarding his claim 
until after Catherine's death.7 
Southwick could have easily protected his claim to the P.O.D. account, had he merely 
filed a motion to stay distribution of the funds quickly after Judge Moffat's initial ruling, and 
6While it is unclear whether a comparative negligence standard should strictly be applied to Utah Code 
Ann., § 75-5-42(2), in analyzing the "fault" of the Leones, it would only seem equitable to consider how the 
conduct of Southwick contributed to the events which Southwick claims give rise to the Leones* personal 
liability. 
7Given the evidence discussed above regarding the events at the time of Southwick's divorce from 
Catherine, and the termination of his conservatorship of Catherine, a reasonable inference may be made that 
Southwick attempted to intentionally mislead the Leones into believing that he had no interest in the P.O.D., with 
the intention of later asserting a claim after Catherine's death. This is supported by Southwick's filing of an 
amended divorce complaint which changes only the provision regarding the P.O.D. account, which Southwick 
had previously repudiated, and not serving such complaint on the Leones. Inasmuch as Southwick was not 
available to testify at the August 5, 1994 hearing, no evidence has been elicited from Southwick to explain these 
events. 
29 
obtained a supersedeas bond to secure the court's ruling. As indicated, Judge Moffat's initial 
ruling was on July 16, 1991 (Record, page 224-225), and Appellant filed his notice of appeal 
on August 28, 1991 (Record, page 237). Appellant filed a motion to stay on October 30, or 
approximately 8 weeks after the notice of appeal. (Record, pp. 253-258). The funds were 
disbursed to Montoya on December 14, 1991. (Record, page 618-619). Though Appellant 
was initially granted his motion to stay several weeks later, such motion was later denied by 
Judge Moffat, on the express grounds that "no supersedeas bond was filed to prevent any 
distribution of said funds pending appeal." (Record, page 367). 
Rule 62(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, affords an Appellant an easy method of 
obtaining a stay, as follows: 
When appeal is taken the Appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a 
stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law of these rules. The 
bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay 
is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court. 
Thus, Southwick could have easily protected his claimed interest in the P.O.D. 
account, and provided security for the Leones in respect to their duties to distribute funds to 
Montoya, by following the simple procedure set forth in Rule 62(d). He failed to do so. 
All of these actions and inaction by Southwick most certainly contributed in a 
substantial way to the outcome for which he attempts to hold the Leones personally liable. 
Southwick's conduct was considered by the trial court in making its determinations, and 
cannot be overlooked in fairly assessing the "fault" of the Leones. Based on all such 
evidence, the court properly found that the Leones were not "at fault." 
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Conversion 
In support of his argument that the Leones should be held personally liable to 
Southwick, and without any support whatever, Southwick concludes that the Leones 
"converted" the P.O.D. account. Assuming, arguendo, that conversion is a proper legal basis 
under Utah law for finding "fault" and personal liability of a conservator, there is no basis for 
asserting that the Leones are liable under a claim of conversion in the instant case, as 
discussed below. 
"Conversion" is defined as a "distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over 
another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his title or rights therein, or in 
derogation, exclusion, or defiance of such title or rights, without the owner's consent, and 
without lawful justification." [emphasis added]. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Conversion, §1; (See also 89 
C.J.S., Trover & Conversion, § 3 ("a wrongful deprivation [of personal property] to the 
owner); Satterfield v. Sunny Day Resources, Inc., 581 P.2d 1386 (Wyo. 1978) (conversion is 
"dominion wrongfully executed over one's property"). 
Acts which would otherwise constitute a conversion may be considered not to be a 
conversion, where they are done "by authority of law, by direction or order of a court, or by 
authority of valid process." 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Conversion, §91. Section 266 of the Second 
Restatement of Torts, states as follows: 
One is privileged to commit acts which would otherwise be a trespass to a 
chattel or a conversion when he acts pursuant to a court order which is valid or 
fair on its face. 
Thus, it is well established that liability for conversion does not attach to a party who 
takes property which "under the law he has a right to take." White Co. v. Canton Transp. 
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Co., 2 N.E.2d 501, 505 (Ohio 1936). See also Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. 
People's Loan Service, Inc., 351 So. 2d 852, 853 (La. App. 1977) ("Conversion, a wrongful 
act, cannot spring from the exercise of a legal right, i.e., execution on a judgment"); Hopper 
v.Bills, 232 So. 2d 296, 300, 301 (La. 296) ("Conversion is a tort, a wrongful act, which in 
the nature of things cannot spring from a legal right"; no conversion when defendant is acting 
under valid process); Van Porn v. Couch, 64 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Ca. App. 1937) ("no 
conversion when a person takes property rightfully"). 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Leones' alleged act of conversion was 
made pursuant to a valid and lawful order of the court. Appellant may argue that the alleged 
act of conversion occurred at the time Appellant made demand for his share of the P.O.D. 
account, or prior to the order of Judge Moffat and the disbursement of funds to Montoya. 
However, it is well settled that a failure to deliver upon demand does not constitute a 
conversion, if such refusal is qualified, for a reasonable purpose and a reasonable length of 
time: 
Not every failure to deliver upon demand, however, will constitute a 
conversion. . . And even when he has possession, a qualified refusal, for a 
reasonable purpose and reasonable length of time, is not a conversion. The 
defendant may detain the goods for a reasonable time to identify the plaintiff, 
to determine his right to possession, to ascertain whether charges against the 
goods are correct, or if he is an agent, to consult the principal from whom he 
received them. All such detentions must, however, be made in good faith, with 
the reason stated. . . 
William L. Prosser, Law of Torts, Conversion, 4th Edition, Section 15, p. 91. 
In the instant case, the Leones immediately sought instructions from the court after 
Appellant made demand for his share of the P.O.D. account. Given the circumstances of this 
case, discussed in detail above, the Leones' refusal to deliver funds to Southwick was 
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reasonable until a determination could be made regarding his rights. Once the court made a 
ruling on this issue, denying Southwickfs claim to the P.O.D. account, the Leones were simply 
following the court's decision regarding ownership of P.O.D. account, in disbursing funds to 
Montoya. Consistent with the law cited above, such acts clearly do not constitute conversion. 
Utah case law supports the principle that conversion must be a wrongful, unauthorized 
act of dominion or ownership. Christensen v. Pugh, 36 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1934). 
Additionally, to constitute conversion, there must be a willful interference with a chattel 
"done without lawful justification." Allred v. Hinklev, 328 P. 726, 728 (Utah 1958). 
In summary, given the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court had a 
sufficient basis for concluding that the Leones, in acting pursuant to court orders and advice 
of counsel, were not "at fault" as required by Utah Code. Ann. §75-5-429. Accordingly, the 
trial court's ruling that the Leones are not personally liable to Southwick, should stand. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE EXPENSES IN ITS 
MEMORANDUM RULING AS LEGITIMATE EXPENSES FOR "MRS. 
SOUTHWICKS NECESSARY SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE. 
Without bothering to marshall or address the evidence on the record, Appellant 
contends that the trial court erred in allowing approximately $12,758 in expenses to be 
charged against the P.O.D. account as legitimate expenses incurred for Catherine Leone's 
necessary support and maintenance. Although not addressed in Appellant's brief, Judge 
Rokich made this factual determination and allowed these expenses, consisting of burial 
expenses, conservator fees, costs for a television and antenna, and court costs, after carefully 
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considering the evidence presented at a hearing on August 5, 1994, as discussed below. (See 
Reporter's Transcript beginning at page 744 of Record). 
Appellant contends that these expenses were not validly granted by the trial court 
because "these expenses violate the provisions of the January 24, 1988 Stipulation, for the 
care of Mrs. Southwick and the expenses violate this Court's March 2, 1988 Order, specifying 
how the funds of the P.O.D. account may be spent." In support of this position, Appellant 
argues that the Stipulation and related order of the Court provided that the P.O.D. account 
may be used only to pay medical expenses incurred for the benefit of Catherine Leone, and 
"other necessary support and maintenance," and then concludes, with no rationale whatever, 
that the expenses allowed by the trial court were not "necessary for Mrs. Southwick's support 
and maintenance." It is entirely unclear from the record, or from Appellant's Brief, how 
Appellant arrives at this conclusion. Ironically, Appellant evidently believes he is in a 
position to unilaterally determine what expenses are necessary, while concluding that Judge 
Rokich was not. Furthermore, these expenses are clearly of a nature such that the trial court 
could reasonably conclude they are for necessary support and maintenance. It was, therefore, 
perfectly within the province of the trial court to find these particular expenses to be 
unnecessary. 
It is clear from a reading of the Stipulation and March 2, 1988 order, that the P.O.D. 
account was intended to be used to cover not only medical expenses but expenses deemed 
necessary for the "support and maintenance" of Catherine Southwick. ^ e trial court, after 
In his brief, Appellant appears to imply that only expenses for "medical care and treatment" should be 
allowable. (See page 15 of Appellant's brief, in which he states that "A comatose person does not need a large 
screen TV as part of her medical care and treatment"). 
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reviewing and weighing all of the evidence, was in the best position to determine what 
expenses were necessary for Catherine's support and maintenance (as compared to Southwick, 
who, having abandoned his wife, was in no position to know the nature of Catherine's needs). 
It certainly makes sense that the money should be used to care for Catherine, and to make her 
remaining days comfortable, since the money was originally hers. 
Each of the expense items disputed by Appellant are addressed separately below. 
Burial Expenses 
While gracious enough to concede that "expenses of Mrs. Southwick's burial needed to 
be paid," Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the costs of Mrs. 
Southwick's burial were chargeable to the P.O.D. account, and that "the Leones had funds 
other than the P.O.D. account available for payment of these expenses." Appellant then 
concludes, without any support whatsoever, that "the Stipulation and Order of the trial court 
and Utah law require that the assets of Mrs. Southwick's estate be used for her burial and 
expenses before the P.O.D. account can be invaded".9 (Appellant's Brief, page 14). 
Prior to the death of Catherine Leone, the Leones used funds in the P.O.D. account to 
pay for a burial plot and certain burial expenses. (Record, at 782, 785, and Exhibit 2-P of 
August 5, 1995 hearing). Sam Leone testified that there were no other monies available to 
Respondents have searched in vain for such a prohibition in the Stipulation or Order; it simply does not 
exist. Similarly, Appellant has not cited any "Utah law" supporting this position, and Respondents are not aware 
of any statutory or case law which supports a prohibition as described. 
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pay for a burial plan purchased by the Leones for Catherine at a cost of $5,522 (Record, pp. 
785-786).10 
In the hearing on August 5, 1995, Judge Rokich addressed the appropriateness of the 
burial expenses in stating "That's a necessary expense. Where are you going to bury her?"; 
and "It says care and maintenance. You got to bury her. . . So the Mount Calvary expense 
would be allowed." [emphasis added]. (Record, page 834; also see page 835). Appellant, 
obviously not as concerned, then or now, with the issue of Catherine's burial, is clearly not in 
as good a position as the trial court to determine the appropriateness of this expenditure. 
Court Costs 
Appellant disputes the sum of $180.93 in court costs charged to the P.O.D account by 
the trial court, claiming that such sum was incurred in "defending against Southwick's claim 
for his share of the P.O.D. account." Once again, there is no support for this contention. 
Such expenses were, rather, court costs incurred in connection with the administration by the 
Leones, as co-conservators, of Catherine's estate, and, as such, were determined by the trial 
court to be necessary for Catherine's maintenance and support. 
Television and Antenna 
In an incredible display of callousness and complete disregard for, and 
mischaracterization of, the trial record, Appellant contends that the trial court was in error in 
allowing the sum of $1,035.31 for a television and antenna for Catherine Leone while she 
In Appellant's Brief, appellant incorrectly contends that the Leones received $16,700 during the time 
they acted as co-conservators, which they could have used to pay expenses. While the accountings do reflect 
sums being received from social security and disability payments, such amounts were additionally used in their 
entirety to pay nursing care costs and other expenses. As indicated in Sam Leone's testimony, there was no 
additional monies available to pay these expenses. 
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was in the Bennion Care Center. Appellant's bases for this contention are that the Stipulation 
and Order state that "Mrs. Southwick is comatose," which fact is "further acknowledged by 
Sam Leone." (See Appellant's Brief at page 15).11 In making these assertions, Appellant 
flagrantly contradicts the testimony of Sam Leone at the August 5, 1995 hearing: 
(Transcript of August 5, 1995 hearing, beginning at Record, page 780, line 24): 
Q: (By Mr. Hadley): Now, referring to some of these expenses, I would like 
to refer you to page three, jumping back and forth. January 20, 1990, there's a 
check to Silo TV for Katie, $984.31. 
A: (Sam Leone): That's right. 
Q: What was that for? 
A: My sister was coming out of her coma and the only thing that she could 
do was watch television. We decided to get her the very best television we 
could, which she could manipulate and control. 
Q: What's she — I know she was in a coma and disabled. Was there any 
type of contact with her at all that she recognized anybody around her? 
A: Yes, yes. She was originally in a coma, but she had made recovery to the 
point where she was quadriplegic and — but she did regain a great deal of her 
senses. 
Mr. Schultz: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this and move to strike. He's 
testifying as to medical conditions and I don't think he's qualified to do that 
until that's established. 
The Court (Judge Rokich): The objection is overruled. 
(Record, page 786, beginning at line 6). 
Interestingly, it is this allegedly comatose person who Southwick served by mail a copy of his amended 
divorce complaint. 
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Q: Next check is numbered 107. It's out of order. It says Sam Leone for TV 
Antenna Connector $51? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was that for? 
A: She [Catherine] wasn't getting very good reception in her nursing home. I 
had to go out and buy a special antenna for that. I didn't have money on me, 
so I had to use the check book. 
Q: Now, there's a deposit on February 2nd, Silos rebate on TV charges, 
$229.46. How did that arise? 
A: My mother and sister went to select the TV for our sister Katie, who was 
in the hospital, and the salesman at Silo charged them insurance, which we 
totally did not want. So I went back to Silo and made them give us the money 
back from the insurance on the appliance, [emphasis added]. 
The only evidence regarding Catherine Leone at the time of the Leones' purchase of 
the television set and antenna is clear and uncontroverted - Catherine Leone was no longer 
comatose; she had regained "a great deal of her senses"; and she could watch, as well as 
manipulate and control, a television set.12 In complete disregard for this testimony, however, 
Appellant shockingly represents to this Court that "a comatose person does not need a large 
screen TV as a part of her medical care and treatment," and concludes, without any factual 
support in the record whatever, that "Southwick already had a television in her room, and 
there was no need to buy another one". (Appellant's Brief, page 15). 
Given Catherine Leone's condition as described in the testimony of Sam Leone, it is 
difficult to conceive of an expense more justifiable and necessary for her support and 
maintenance, than the purchase of a nice television set and antenna which allowed Catherine 
Appellant also ignores other portions of Sam Leone's testimony, where he indicates that at one point, after 
their appointment as conservators: "Catherine was communicating by a little computer board. She could answer 
yes or no; she could spell." (Record at page 787). 
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one of the few, if not the only, comforts or pleasures in the months prior to her death. 
Because there is no evidence that Appellant was aware of the changes in Catherine in the 
months prior to her death (indeed, there is evidence that he "abandoned her" after he 
terminated her conservatorship, Record, page 788), Appellant was not, and is not, in a 
position to make the claims asserted in Appellant's brief that such expenses were not 
necessary for her maintenance and support. The Leones, the co-conservators and people 
caring for Catherine, were clearly in the best position to determine what was necessary for 
Catherine's support and maintenance. 
Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. 
Further, he has intentionally disregarded and mischaracterized the only relevant evidence from 
Sam Leone on this issue. Under these circumstances, this Court must refuse to consider his 
attack upon the trial court's findings and further. (Hagan, supra). 
Conservator Fees 
Appellant argues that conservator fees, though "an expense legitimately chargeable to 
the estate of a person, if timely made and documented, . . . are not chargeable to a P.O.D. 
account." Appellant offers no legal support for this position. 
The order pertaining to Catherine's conservatorship simply provides that distributions 
may be made from the POD account to pay "medical expenses incurred for the benefit of the 
protected person, and to pay other expenses incurred for the necessary support and 
maintenance of the protected person" (Record, at 29). This account, which was 
unquestionably established for the care and maintenance of Catherine (and not to ensure a 
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minimum disbursement to Southwick as the pay-on-death beneficiary), does not preclude or 
limit in any fashion the payment of conservator fees, where appropriate. 
The Leones devoted literally hundreds of hours of their time and attention, after 
Southwick had divorced Catherine, removed himself as conservator, and abandoned her 
(Record, at 782, 788), to the care and maintenance of their sister. The trial court is in the 
best position to determine, based on all of the evidence before it, whether the care of the 
Leones, as co-conservators, was necessary for Catherine's support and maintenance. In 
considering this question, the trial court had the opportunity to review the billing requests and 
time records of the Leones, and to hear the testimony of Sam Leone, to determine the scope 
and validity of the time devoted by the Leones on behalf of their incapacitated sister, 
Catherine. (See Billing Requests, Record, pp. 274-294). Ultimately, the trial court made a 
factual determination that the conservators were entitled to an award of $5,000 for their time 
and devotion to their sister. 
Interestingly, while Southwick claims that conservator fees to the Leones are improper, 
he did not hesitate in asking for and receiving compensation from the trial court for his "time 
and costs" on behalf of Catherine, at the time he sought to be appointed as the conservator of 
Catherine. (See Record, pp. 14-16, 44-45). 
Appellant's argument that conservator fees were improperly awarded because such 
fees were not timely requested, is addressed in the sections below. 
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POINT IV 
SINCE THE EXPENSES AWARDED BY THE 
COURT WERE PROPER, THE TRIAL COURTS 
COMPUTATION OF THE AMOUNT OF SOUTHWICKS 
SHARE OF THE P.O.D ACCOUNT WAS CORRECT 
In Point II of Appellant's brief, Southwick contends that, since the trial court 
improperly deducted costs of Catherine's burial plot, burial plan, television and antenna, court 
costs and antenna, and conservator fees, the Court incorrectly calculated Appellant's share of 
the P.O.D. account. Because the trial court had a sufficient basis for concluding that these 
expenses were necessary for Catherine's support and maintenance, Appellant's conclusion that 
such expenses were not properly deducted from the P.O.D. account is erroneous. 
As discussed in the argument set forth above, all of these costs and expenses were 
properly addressed, awarded and deducted from the P.O.D. account by the trial court, as 
expenses which were "necessary for Catherine's support and maintenance." Therefore, the 
trial court's computation of Appellant's share of the P.O.D. account was supported by the 
evidence, and was clearly not erroneous. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED CONSERVATOR 
FEES IN THIS MATTER 
A. Contrary to the Contentions of Appellant, There has Been no Finding of Unclean 
Hands or Breach of Fiduciary Duty by the Leones which Would Bar Conservator Fees. 
In Point III of Appellant's argument, Appellant asserts that the Leone's request for 
conservator fees are barred under the doctrine of unclean hands and by their "breach of their 
fiduciary duties." These conclusions again ignore the record, and demonstrate Appellant's 
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failure, and unwillingness, to marshall and address the evidence which supported the trial 
court's findings, and to demonstrate that, despite such evidence, the trial court's findings with 
respect to the conservator fees were clearly erroneous. 
Appellant's claims concerning the Leones' "unclean hands" and "breach of fiduciary 
duty," represent nothing more than an attempt to prejudice this appeal through smear tactics. 
These accusations are quite ironic in light of Appellant's conduct: He divorced Catherine and 
abandoned his duties as conservator, long before Catherine's death, only to return after her 
death to claim the "spoils." Such attempts include several spurious claims concerning the 
Leones; that they (1) requested (in what Appellant describes as "the epitome of gaul [sic]"), 
$30,000 in conservator fees, as an amount greatly exceeding the amount paid to the Bennion 
Care Center;13 (2) "willfully, knowingly and maliciously ignored the trial court's order and 
failed to keep the funds deposited in the P.O.D. account in a separate account"; (3) used the 
funds in the P.O.D. account for purposes other than the care of Mrs. Southwick"; (4) co-
mingled [sic] funds of the P.O.D. account with personal funds; and (5) used the funds to 
invest in bonds and/or mutual funds. Appellant then attempts to further malign the Leones by 
asserting that their actions "manifest a conscious disregard and contempt not only for the trial 
court, its orders and the judicial system in general but also an utter destain [sic] for the law 
and their fiduciary duties . . . " 
Appellant again shows his willingness to distort the record. At the August 5, 1994 hearing, counsel for 
the Leones requested as conservator fees only what the Court deemed reasonable. (Record, page 842). In 
addition, Catherine was only in Bennion Care Center for approximately seven months, despite Appellant's claim 
(page 18 of Appeal Brief) that "the total bill to the Bennion Care Center during the referenced period was less 
than $18,000,. . .for twenty four hour a day care, 365 days a year." 
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Respondent has not produced, and cannot produce, one iota of evidence supporting the 
claim that the Leones "came before the Court with unclean hands." Quite to the contrary, the 
record is abundantly clear that from the day Southwick turned the conservatorship over to the 
Leones, Sam Leone and Frank Leone attempted to carry out their duties as co-conservators in 
a responsible manner to the best of their abilities consistent with their obligations under Utah 
state law. As discussed above under Point II, Judge Rokich reviewed the facts and 
circumstances concerning the Leones' conservatorship and concluded that they were not "at 
fault" in their duties. In sum, there is no evidence that (a) the Leones received any benefit in 
their duties as conservators; (b) the account suffered any losses; or (c) the Leone's conduct 
violated the applicable standard of care in any respect. 
B. The Leones' Claim for Conservator Fees is not Barred by the Statute of Limitations 
In an apparent misinterpretation of Utah Code Annotated, Sections 75-3-803(1) and 
75-3-803(3)(b), Appellant argues that the Leones' claim for conservators fees are barred by 
the statute of limitations. In making this claim, Appellant again ignores the record, which 
demonstrates that Respondents' claims for conservator fees was "presented" within the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
Respondents' requests for conservator fees were largely for services performed as the 
co-conservators of Catherine prior to her death on January 25, 1991. As indicated by 
Appellant, such claims are, therefore, governed by Section 75-5-803(1), Utah Code 
Annotated, which provides that "all claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the 
death of decedent" are barred "unless presented" within "one year after the decedent's death". 
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Similarly, Section 75-3-803(b) cited by Appellant, bars any claim against a decedent's estate 
which arose "at or after the death of the decedent" unless "presented" within the later of three 
months after it arises, or the time specified in Subsection 1(a)" [one year after decedent's 
death]. 
The record clearly establishes that Sam Leone and Frank Leone "presented" their 
requests for conservator fees to William Hadley, the attorney for the estate, on April 22, 
1991, and April 10, 1991, respectively. (See Record, pp. 274-294, and, specifically, 
submittals on pages 288 and 294, respectively), or less than three months after Catherine's 
death on January 25, 1991. Accordingly, such requests were "presented" well within the one 
year statutory period provided under Section 75-5-803(1). 
Section 75-3-804 provides that a claim may be "presented" by delivering a copy of 
the claim to the personal representative or his attorney. William Hadley, the attorney for 
Catherine's estate, is tantamount to the attorney for the personal representative. In any event, 
requisite notice to the parties intended under the statute was provided. 
Appellant bases his claim that Respondents request for conservator fees is time barred 
on the fact that "the Leones' claim for Conservator Fees was not filed within the time 
required by statute". However, the statutory provisions referred to above do not require that a 
claim be "filed" but merely "presented". As indicated, the record supports a finding that the 
Leones' claim for conservator fees was "presented" to William Hadley, counsel to the estate, 
within the statutory period. 
Appellant has again failed to marshall or address the evidence which supported the 
trial court's findings, or to demonstrate that the findings were clearly erroneous. Appellant 
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has either ignored, or chosen to disregard, the billing requests submitted by the Leones, which 
indicate that the Leones' requests for conservator fees were submitted to William Hadley, 
attorney for Catherine's estate, within the applicable statutory period. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED THE PAYMENT OF EXPENSES, 
INCLUDING EXPENSES FOR MRS. LEONES BURIAL, THE PURCHASE OF A 
TELEVISION AND ANTENNA, AND CONSERVATOR FEES, AND Appellants 
CONTENTION THAT SUCH EXPENSES WERE NOT TIMELY PAID IS 
ERRONEOUS 
In Point IV of Appellant's argument, beginning at page 21, Appellant, in apparent 
disregard for the financial records of the Leones' co-conservatorship, argues that, as a matter 
of law, the co-conservators had no authority to pay the "alleged expenses for Mrs. 
Southwick's burial plot, her burial expenses, the Leone's co-conservator fees, the television & 
antenna, and court costs," "after Mrs. Southwick's [Leone's] death". 
While Respondents do not take issue with Appellant's articulation of the legal principle 
that "the death of the guardianship terminates the guardianship," Appellant's contention that 
these expenses were not authorized completely ignores the record. Very simply, in advancing 
this argument, Appellant fails to point out that the evidence demonstrates that, with the 
exception of the co-conservator fees (and possibly $180 in court costs), these expenses were 
incurred and paid by the Leones prior to the death of Catherine Leone. 
Catherine Leone died on January 25, 1991 (Record, page 98). In Schedule 3 of an 
accounting of the Leones dated January 26, 1991, and submitted to the Court on or March 22, 
1991, the Leones itemize the disbursements made by the co-conservators. This itemization 
clearly shows that the expenses for the television and antenna, and the burial costs, disputed 
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by Appellant, were incurred and paid prior to the death of Catherine Leone. (See Record, at 
page 80, and findings of fact and conclusions of law, Record at page 661.) 
In asserting this argument, Appellant has not only failed to marshall all of the evidence, but 
has actually chosen to ignore, and even distort, the evidence. 
Because the burial expenses and television expenses were paid prior to Catherine's 
death, the trial court clearly had a sufficient factual basis to support its findings with respect 
to these expenses. Since Appellant has failed to marshall all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings of fact and, despite such evidence, demonstrate that the findings were 
erroneous, the trial court's ruling with respect to these expenses should be affirmed. 
The only remaining issue (under this argument of Appellant's), is whether the co-
conservator fees (and court costs) paid by the Leones, which were deducted from the P.O.D. 
account after the death of Catherine, were properly allowed by the trial court. It is clear that 
the conservator fees were for services performed during the life of Catherine, and submitted 
to the estate shortly following the death of Catherine. Similarly, the court costs allowed by 
the trial court were incurred prior to the death of Catherine. 
The purpose of the establishment of the pay-on-death account was to provide 
necessary funds for the legitimate expenses for Catherine Leones' necessary support and 
maintenance. The Leones do not dispute the principle that "a guardian has no power to pay 
debts or obligations of the ward's estate." Matter of Guardianship of Heath's Estate, 632 P.2d 
908, (Wa. 1981). However, these expenses were properly incurred for the necessary support 
and maintenance of Catherine prior to her death, and were a valid obligation of Catherine's 
estate. In arguing that the conservators were not authorized to pay these obligations from the 
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P.O.D. account, Southwick is quite obviously attempting to avoid the payment of expenses 
which were otherwise properly incurred, and to make the conservators personally liable for 
expenses otherwise chargeable to the P.O.D. account, solely because they were not paid prior 
to Catherine's death. Such a result would be manifestly inequitable.14 
XI 
CONCLUSION 
There is substantial evidence, not addressed by Southwick, supporting the trial court's 
ruling regarding that the Leones were not at "fault" or personally liable to Southwick. The 
standard in determining the liability of a conservator is the "reasonable man" standard, not a 
strict liability standard (as suggested by Southwick), and the trial court gave due consideration 
to all of the evidence in this case, including the testimony of Sam Leone, in concluding that 
the Leones did no breach the applicable standard of care. The Leones disbursed the funds to 
Montoya only after careful consideration, and after receiving instructions from the trial court 
and advice of counsel. In these circumstances, the trial court was not in error in concluding 
that the Leones were not personally liable. 
Similarly, the trial court properly allowed certain expenses to be deducted against 
Southwick's share of the P.O.D. account. The trial court had sufficient evidence to conclude 
that such expenses were necessary for Catherine's support and maintenance. Such expenses 
were incurred prior to Catherine's death and timely presented, and are not time-barred as 
claimed by Appellant. 
14In the August 5, 1994 hearing, Judge Rokich acknowledged this in indicating that expenses which were 
incurred prior to Catherine's death "would be funds owed by the conservator account or guardian account to the 
estate, so they can be paid." (Record, page 837). 
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In reviewing these issues, the Court of Appeals should also consider that Southwick 
has been granted a judgment against Montoya, the only party who derived a personal benefit 
from the actions which Appellant believes give rise to this appeal. For whatever reason, 
Southwick has elected not to undertake collection proceedings against Montoya, opting 
instead to attack the integrity, character, and good faith of the Leones. 
While Appellant has attacked the trial court's findings and ruling following the August 
5, 1994, hearing, he has completely failed to marshall and address all of the evidence which 
would support such findings. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that an 
appellant marshall all of the evidence and then demonstrate that, despite such evidence, the 
trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Appellant has failed to meet this burden of proof; 
therefore, the trial court's decision and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f f c i a y of June, 1996. 
IENTI & LEWIS 
JamesC. Lewis 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i oik 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Certificate of Service this ; ' 
day of June, 1996, to: 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Appellant 
P.O. Box 526382 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382 
William R. Hadley 
Kunz, Kunz & Hadley 
Attorney for the Estate of Catherine Leone 
2225 East Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Christine Montoya (Rogers) 
P.O. Box 3732 




(any material not included in addendum of Appellant) 
A. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (Record, pp. 19-22). 
B. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Appointing Southwick 
Conservator and Establishing P.O.D. Account (Record, pp. 27-31). 
C. Initial Divorce Complaint, Summons and Return of Service (Record, pp. 
139-142). 
D. Amended Divorce Complaint (with Certificate of Mailing), Certificate of 
Default and Divorce Decree (Record, pp.143-147, 152-154) 
E. Southwick's Guardian Transfer Funds Receipt (Record, page 191). 
F. Minute Entry of Judge Moffat dated July 16, 1991 (Record pp. 224-226). 
G. Order of Judge Moffat dated July 31, 1991 (pp. 227-228). 
H. Order Nunc Pro Tunc of Judge Moffat dated July 31,1991 (Record, pp. 
229-230). 
I. Minute Order of Judge Moffat dated May 12,1992 (Record, pp. 368-370). 
J. Memorandum Decision of Judge Rokich dated September 27,1994 
(Record, pp. 618-622). 
K. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law of Judge Bohling dated May 19, 1995 
(Record, pp. 694-699). 
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ADDENDUM A 
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
MICHAEL R. SCIUMBATO, #2894 
JOSEPH H. GALLEGOS, #1143 
GALLEGOS & SCIUMBATO 
Attorneys for Leone Family 
333 South Denver S t r e e t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Telephone: . (801) 364-6522 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
CATHERINE SOUTHWICK, 
a Protected Person. 
: STIPULATION AND 
: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
: Probate No. P-87-1223 
COMES NOW Tracy Southwick, spouse of the above-named protected 
p e r s o n , by and through h is counsel, Noall T. Wootton, Attorney a t Law, and 
G i l d a Leone, mother of the above-named protected person, Catherine Montoya, 
d a u g h t e r of t h e above-namsd protected person, and Same Leone, brother of 
t h e above-named protected person, by and through t he i r counsel, Michael R. 
Sciumbato of the law firm of GALLEGOS & SCIUMBATO, and hereby s t i pu l a t e and 
agree as follows: 
1. Tha t t h e above-named p r o t e c t e d p e r s o n i s n o t lega l ly 
compe ten t by r e a s o n of t h e f a c t t h a t she i s ccmatose. Accordingly, 
a p p o i n t m e n t of a G u a r d i a n and C o n s e r v a t o r i s necessary as a means of 
p r o v i d i n g c o n t i n u i n g c a r e and supervision for the above-named protected 
p e r s o n , and because the above-named protected person i s presently unable to 
manage he r p r o p e r t y and a f f a i r s by r e a s o n of her d i s a b i l i t y , and has 
p r o p e r t y which may be w a s t e d o r diss ipated unless proper management i s 
provided. 
FEB 3 -1988 
H. Dixon Hindley, Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
By y^f-Z^st^t *i^ c^i ~ 
Deputy Clerk 
2. That t h e above-naired protected person is a resident of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah; accordingly, venue is proper in this County. 
3. That t h e above-named protected person has assets consisting 
of, inter a l i a , interests in real property and vehicles. 
4. That t he above-named p r o t e c t e d person has in her name, 
j o i n t l y with her mother , Gi lda Leone, of a time cer t i f icate of deposit 
account a t Val ley Bank and Truct Company in t he approximate sum of 
$40 ,000 .00 . A copy of said time certificate of deposit is attached hereto 
as "Exhibit A", and incorporated herein by reference. The proceeds in said 
account a r e from the sale of a hone which the protected person owned, and 
which proceeds she placed in said account with her mother as co-cwner. 
The part ies st ipulate and agree that Gilda Leone i s a co-cwner of 
s a id accoun t , and accordingly, the proceeds in said account shall not be 
cons idered and held as an a s s e t of the Estate of the protected person. 
Ra the r , t he proceeds of said account shall be placed by Gilda Leone into a 
s e p a r a t e , l i q u i d , interest-bearing, federally-insured account with Tracy 
Southwick, spouse of the protected person, and Sam Leone, brother of the 
p r o t e c t e d person as joint co-signatories of said account. They shall make 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s from said account to pay nodical expenses incurred for the 
b e n e f i t of the protect person, and to pay other expenses incurred for the 
necessa ry support and maintenance of the protected person. The agreement 
and s i g n a t u r e of both Tracy Southwick and Sam Leone shall be required 
before any expenditures may be made frcm the account. 
Ca ther ine Montoya, the daughter of the above-named 
p r o t e c t e d person , and Tracy Southwick, s h a l l be named as the 
pay-on-death b e n e f i c i a r y on sa id account , each to sha re e q u a l l y . 
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5. Tha t T racy S o u t h w i c k , spouse of the above-named protected 
p e r s o n , should be appointed General Guardian and Gonservator of the Estate 
of the above-named protected person, to serve without bond, 
6. Tha t a l l p a r t i e s s h a l l bear the i r own a t to rney ' s fees and 
costs incurred here in . ^ 
tfl' day of JthJbte DATED this 
"if , 1988. 
Gilda Leone 
Mother of Protected Person 
S 
JfcMfh VL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r 
, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: 
17-20 ^ 
{ NOTARY PUBLIC ^ 
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 
*-L— 
Catherine Montoya- If 
Daughter of Protected Person 
dfM, SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 'MtfaA „~ , 1988. 
day of 
-N9^RY-PU5L1 
Residing a t : Sal t Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
Tracy Southwick 
Duse of Protected Person 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me on t h i s 25 th day of 
J a n u a r y , 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commissions Expires: 3 / 2 / 8 9 Residing a t : American Fo rk . UT 
>ni ( UM^ 
d$»u <4> 
S&m Leone 
Brother of Protected Person 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r ^ l f i e on t h v £ 
'
 1988#
 ^^/l / d a y o f 
My Commission Exp i res : 
)2- Z?-?V 
ARSTPUBLIC 
Residing a t : S a l t Lake C i t y f Utah 
GALLEGOS & SCI 
Michael R. Sciiimbato 
At torney for Leone Family 
Noal l T. Wootton 
At torney for Tracy Southwick 
ADDENDUM B 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Appointing Southwick Conservator 
and Establishing P.O.D. Account 
I HLlVitL) 
MICHAEL R. SaUMBATO, #2894 
JOSEPH H. GALLEGOS, #1143 
GALLEGOS & SCTUMBATO 
Attorneys for Leone Family 
333 South Denver Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6522 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFF!' 
Salt Lake County Utah 
MAR 2.1933 
H. Dixon Hindley. Clerk 3rd Dist. 
By —c — 5;p uwc 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
CATHERINE SOUTHWICK, 
a Protected Person. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER OF APPOINTMENT OF 
GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR 
Probate No. P-87-1223 
The Amended P e t i t i o n of Tracy Southwick for Appointment as 
G u a r d i a n and Conse rva to r of the above-named protected person came on for 
h e a r i n g on Wednesday, the 3rd day of February, 1988, before the Honorable 
John A. R o k i c h , Judge of t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Cour t , Judge 
p r e s i d i n g ; and i t appearing to the Court tha t Pe t i t ioner Tracy Southwick, 
by and t h r o u g h N o a l l T. Wootton, Attorney a t Law, h is counsel of record, 
and G i l d a Leone , C a t h e r i n e Montoya and Sam Leone, the mother, adul t 
d a u g h t e r and brother of the above-named protected person, respect ive ly , by 
and t h r o u g h t h e i r counsel of record, Michael R. Sciumbato of the law firm 
of GALELGOS & SCIUMBATO, had e n t e r e d i n t o a wr i t t en St ipulat ion and 
S e t t l e m e n t Agreemen t , p u r s u a n t to which they s t ipula ted to entry of an 
Order a p p p o i n t i n g Tracy Southwick as General Guardian and Conservator of 
t h e E s t a t e of t h e above-named p r o t e c t e d person, which St ipulat ion and 
Se t t l emen t Agreement was read and approved by the Court; and based upon the 
s a i d Stipulat ion and Settlement Agreement, and in accordance therewith, and 
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good c a u s e appear ing therefore , the Court now hereby makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Tha t C a t h e r i n e Southwick, the above-named protected person, 
i s p r e s e n t l y coma tose and i s n o t l e g a l l y competent by reason of said 
d i s a b i l i t y . 
2. Tha t t h e above-named protected person i s a res ident of Sa l t 
Lake Coun ty , S t a t e of U t a h , and a c c o r d i n g l y , venue i s proper in t h i s 
county. 
3 . Tha t t h e above-named protected person has asse t s consist ing 
of, in te r a l i a , i n t e r e s t s in rea l property and vehic les . 
4 . Tha t t h e above-named p r o t e c t e d pe r son has in her name, 
j o i n t l y with her mother, Gilda Leone, of a time c e r t i f i c a t e deposit account 
a t V a l l e y Bank and T r u s t Company in the approximate sum of $40,000.00. 
The p r o c e e d s i n s a i d a c c o u n t a r e from t h e s a l e of a home which the 
p r o t e c t e d person owned, and which proceeds she placed in said account with 
her mother as oo-cwner. 
From t h e f o r e g o i n g Findings of Fact , the Court now hereby makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
1. Tha t appointinent of a Guardian for the above-named protected 
p e r s o n i s n e c e s s a r y and des i rable as a means of providing continuing care 
and supervision of the above-named protected person. 
2. Tha t a p p o i n t m e n t of a C o n s e r v a t o r of the Estate of the 
above-named p r o t e c t e d person i s necessary because she i s unable to manage 
h e r p r o p e r t y and a f f a i r s e f f e c t i v e l y f o r t h e r e a s o n of her present 
d i s a b i l i t y and has propety which wi l l be wasted or d iss ipated unless proper 
management i s provided. 
3 . Tha t G i l d a Leone i s a co-owner w i t h t h e above-named 
p r o t e c t e d person of the time c e r t i f i c a t e of deposit account a t Valley Bank 
and T r u s t Company h a v i n g a b a l a n c e of approx i i r a t e ly $40,000.00, and 
acco rd ing ly , the proceeds in said account are not to be considered and held 
as an asse t of the Estate of the protected person. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Tha t T racy S o u t h w i c k , spouse of the above-named protected 
p e r s o n , be and i s hereby appointed General Guardian and Conservator of the 
E s t a t e of t h e above-named protected person, to serve without bond. Upon 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n and acceptance, Let ters of Guardianship and Conservatorship 
sha l l be issued to Tracy Southwick. 
2. Tha t t h e $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p r o c e e d s of the t i n e c e r t i f i c a t e of 
d e p o s i t a c c o u n t a t V a l l e y Bank and Trust Company, owned jo in t ly by the 
above-named p r o t e c t e d p e r s o n and Gilda Leone, sha l l be placed by Gilda 
Leone i n t o a separate , l i q u i d , in te res t -bear ing , federal ly-insured account 
w i t h Tracy S o u t h w i c k , s p o u s e of t h e protected person, and Same Leone, 
b r o t h e r of t h e protected person, as jo in t co-signatories on said account. 
They s h a l l make d i s t r i b u t i o n s frcm said account to pay medical expenses 
i n c u r r e d for the benefi t of the protected person, and to pay other expenses 
i n c u r r e d for the necessary support and maintaince of the protected person. 
The agreement and s ignature of both Tracy Southwick and Sam Leone sha l l be 
required before any expenditures may be made from the account. 
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C a t h e r i n e Montoya, t h e d a u g h t e r of the above-named protected 
p e r s o n , and Tracy Southwick, the spouse of the protected person, sha l l be 
named a s t h e p a y - o n - d e a t h b e n e f i c i a r i e s of said account, each to share 
equally. 
3 . Tha t a l l of the pa r t i e s sha l l bear the i r own a t t o rney ' s fees 
and costs incurred there in . 
DATED t h i s e g day of-£efamary, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
/ 
ATTEST 
H, DIXON HINDLEY 
t ^ CLERK 
By A"> \,AAsCt^/kA<c-> 
Deputy Clerk 
ADDENDUM C 
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8Y. y[ RIGHARD S. NEMELKA NO. 23©e 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
(801) 272-4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY L. SOUTHWICK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KATHERINE J. SOUTHWICK, 
Defendant. 
C O M P L A I N T 
Civil No. ffiWQL 
/ 
Plaintiff alleges as follows: 
1. That plaintiff is a bona fide resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three (3) 
months prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant were married on the J2^S 
day of March, 1986, and are now and ever since have been husband 
and wife. 
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3. That during the course of the marriage various 
irreconcilable differences have arisen making it impossible for 
the plaintiff to continue this marriage and plaintiff is entitled 
to a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony between 
the parties herein. 
4. That the parties have no minor children born as issue 
of this marriage and none are expected. 
5. That both parties are capable of supporting themselves 
and, therefore, neither party should be awarded alimony. 
6. That during the marriage the parties have acquired a 
home and residence located at 150 Jeremy Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, but there is no equity whatsoever in said home and 
residence and, therefore, it is reasonable that the plaintiff be 
awarded the home and residence but also shall assume the 
indebtedness thereon and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
7. That during the marriage the parties have not acquired 
any items of personal property. 
8. That each of the parties brought various items of 
personal property into the marriage specifically the defendant 
has a savings account of approximately $45,000.00 and it is 
reasonable that each party be awarded all of those items of 
personal property that they brought into the marriage including 
but not limited to the defendant being awarded the aforesaid 
savings account. 
2 
9. That the plaintiff is not aware of any debts and 
obligations incurred during the marriage but if there are some 
then it is reasonable that the plaintiff assume and pay said 
debts and obligations and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
10. That it is reasonable that each party be awarded their 
own personal belongings, clothing, jewelry and effects. 
11. That it is reasonable that each party pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prsys that the Court grant unto him a 
Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore 
existing between the parties and to have such consistent with the 
terms and conditions set forth above. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 1989. 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAUE COUNTY, STATE O? 
UTAH. L\/ 
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R I C H A R D S. N E M E t K A N Q A 2 3 9 6 
ATTORNEY AT LAW U lv^/--#tC/ Hrt / 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
(801) 272-4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY L. SOUTHWICK, 
Plaintiff, 
S U M M O N S 
( T w e n t y Day) 
v . 
KATHERINE J . SOUTHWICK, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
Civil Ko.fftH'iO'lllQ M 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT(S): 
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the 
Clerk of the above Court a written answer to the attached 
Complaint, and to serve upon or mail to the plaintiff's 
attorney, at the address shown above, a copy of your answer 
within twenty (20) days after service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail to answer, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint which has 
been filed with the Clerk of the above Court and a copy of which 
is attached and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 1989. 
[ICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Serve defendant at: 
2-7-3O ^c<^>t 5-JOD Sou.*/) 
00141 
88900988 
State of UTAH ) 
County of SALT LAKE) 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
Summons and Complaint 
I hereby certify and make return that I am a resident of the state of 
Utah and a citizen of the United States, over the age of 21 years at the 
time of service herein, and not a party to or interested in the within 
action. 
I received the attached Summons and Complaint on 12/07/89. 1 duly 
served the same upon the named defendant, KATHERINE J. SOUTHWICK, on 
12/08/89, at 0858, at SALT LAKE County, UTAH by leaving a copy with 
KATHERINE SOUTHWICK, the Defendant personally, at C/0 2730 EAST 3300 SO, 
SLC UT, the usual place of abode of the defendant, in SALT LAKE County, 
UTAH. 
Upon serving, 
name and title. 
I duly placed the date of such service as well as my 
Service Fee $ 3.75 
Tri ps 
Mileage Fee $ 6.00 
Special Fee $ 0.00 
Total Due $ 9.75 
NEMELKA, MIyCJ" 
TITLE: Pro, 
Subscr i be'd/^ fnd sworn to before me 
t h i s 1 2 / p ^ / 8 9 . ^ 
My comrp*£rf$? f^on e x p i r e s _ ^ ^ ^ / ^ J V J ^ : _ 
N o t a r y Publ1c 
I— . -
 r . , 
! /&&^$\ GLCnlAKEMELKA 1 
• Rffl&QVa c f^3 ?3Uth 1 S 0° Wast J 
I l5 ' /rVjtfR'fl Sa|"r?keCi!y, Utah 84104 • 
WkSssP/M My Commission Expires i 
I V C o s V y February 13,19S2 • 
f ^ g g ^ State ol Utah « 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 1*103 






Amended Divorce Complaint (with Certificate of Mailing), 
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RIGHARD S. NEMELKA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUTTEt03 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
(801)2724244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY L. SOUTHWICK, 
Plaintiff, ) AMENDED COMPLAINT 
V. ) 
KATHERINE J. SOUTHWICK, ) Civil No. 894903710 DA 
) Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant. ) 
Plaintiff alleges as follows: 
1. That plaintiff is a bona fide resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three (3) 
months prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant were married on the 
day of March, 1986, and are now and ever since have been husband 
and wife. 
00.1.43 
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3. That during the course of the marriage various 
irreconcilable differences have arisen making it impossible for 
the plaintiff to continue this marriage and plaintiff is entitled 
to a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony between 
the parties herein. 
4. That the parties have no minor children born as issue 
of this marriage and none are expected. 
5. That both parties are capable of supporting themselves 
and, therefore, neither party should be awarded alimony. 
6. That during the marriage the parties have acquired a 
home and residence located at 150 Jeremy Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, but there is no equity whatsoever in said home and 
residence and, therefore, it is reasonable that the plaintiff be 
awarded the home and residence but also shall assume the 
indebtedness thereon and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
7. That during the marriage the parties have not acquired 
any items of personal property. 
8. That each of the parties brought various items of 
personal property into the marriage and it is reasonable that 
each party be ^warded all of those items of personal property 
that they brought into the marriage. 
9. That the plaintiff is not aware of any debts and 
obligations incurred during the marriage but if there are some 
then it is reasonable that the plaintiff assume and pay said 
debts and obligations and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
2
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10. That it is reasoanble that each party be awarded 
their own personal belongings, clothing, jewelry and effects. 
11- That it is reasonable that each party pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that the Court grant unto him a 
Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore 
existing between the parties and to have such consistent with the 
terms and conditions set forth above. 
DATE)D this 13th day of December, 1989. 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Amended Complaint to Katherine J. Southwick, defendant, Zions 
Care Center, 2730 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109, 
this 13th day of December, 1989, postage prepaid. 
00145 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
(801)272-4244 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY L. SOUTHWICK, ) 
Plaintiff, ) CERTIFICATE OF DEFAULT 
v. ) 
KATHERINE J. SOUTHWICK, ) Civil No. 894903710 DA 
) Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant. 
In this action, defendant, Katherine J. Southwick, having 
been regularly served with Summons and Complaint, and having 
failed to appear and answer plaintiff's Complaint, and the time 
allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of said 
defendant is hereby entered according to law. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
NO. 2396 
JAN 9 1SS0 
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JAN 9 1SS0 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA NO. 2396 s^v-«-«y; -
ATTORNEY AT LAW /T? 7/7/£ffijg&ft^ 
2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH uy ^ ^ ~ x « ^ . u t > a * ^ j w _ 
SUITE 103 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
(801) 272-4244 
UcVvV/ CiOi^\ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY L. SOUTHWICK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KATHERINE J. SOUTHWICK, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 894903710 DA 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The above matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian of the above-entitled Court on the 9th day 
of January, 1990, plaintiff being present and being represented 
by his attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, and defendant not being 
present and having been served with the Summons and Complaint 
in this matter on the 8th day of December, 1989, and twenty (20) 
days having passed since service of said Summons and Complaint 
and defendant having failed to file her Answer to said Summons 
and Complaint, the default of the defendant having been entered 
and evidence on part of the plaintiff having been introduced and 
the Court having been fully advised in the premises, and the. db\52 
VI IPH' 
Court having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, upon motion of Richard S. Nemelka, Attorney 
for Plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore 
existing between the plaintiff and defendant are hereby dissolved 
and the plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce from the 
defendant, the same to become absolute and final upon the filing 
of the same with the Salt Lake County Clerk, State of Utah. 
2. That no award of alimony is made either the plaintiff 
or the defendant. 
3. That the plaintiff be and is hereby awarded the home 
and residence located at 150 Jeremy Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
and plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume the indebtedness 
thereon and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
4. That each party be and is hereby awarded all of those 
those items of personal property that they brought into the 
marriage. 
5. That defendant be and is hereby ordered to assume and 
pay any and all debts and obligations incurred during the 
marriage and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. 
6. That each party be and is hereby awarded their own 
personal belongings, clothing, jewelry and effects. 
2 
00153 
7. That each party be and is hereby ordered to pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs• 
DATED this 9th day of January, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
~yA / <z^ 
' CERTIFY THAT TMIQ ;o % -^~>.
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•ORIGINAL D O c i J S ^ C M A ? ^ x P O P V 0 i " A N 
DISTRICT COURT SALT i ^ J r A ^ , ' N T H E T H ! R 0 
UTAH. , ' S A L T L A ! v E COUNTY. STATE OF 
DATE: 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
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ADDENDUM E 
Southwick's Guardian Transfer Funds Receipt 
Sam Leone 
8671 Kings Hill Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
November 30, 1989 EXHIBIT # $ 
GUARDIAN TRANSFER FUNDS RECEIPT 
This is to certify that Tracy Southwick endorsed and thus signed over 
to Sam Leone the funds in the amount of $46,241.74 that was held in 
trust for Catherine Southwick, a protected person. This action is 
pursuant to Catherine's guardianship transfer from Tracy to Sam and 
Frank Leone, her brothers. This receipt is intended to absolve Tracy 
southwick of any future accounting or other obligations that may arise 
from the transfer of the funds of the trust account held jointly by Tracy 
and Sam Leone. 
I attest that Tracy Southwick endorsed the two-signature check for the 
above stated amount on this date: .
 A , <~ a, 
Sam Leone 
Tracy SbUthwick Date 
fe!6>- £r? 
Stfe/J * ^ / /*/£/&> 
JEANINE ALLRED \ 
'<&/, y^ifU 
m STA7hO;:LM/iH 
M/Comm, Cxp. Jrn.23,1S33 } 
«B4 S 020 W &C-2M, 81C, UT W UT'•) 
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ADDENDUM F 
Minute Entry of Judge Moffat 
dated July 16, 1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE : MINUTE ENTRY 
GUARDIANSHIP/CONSERVATORSHIP OF: : Case No. 873901223 GC 
CATHERINE L. SOUTHWICK, aka : 
CATHERINE J. LEONE, : 
a protected person. : 
The Court having considered the Co-Conservators7 and 
Co-Guardians7 Motions for Protective Order and Memorandum and 
Reply Memorandum in Support thereof, the Memorandum in 
Opposition thereto and all pleadings on file and being fully 
advised in the premises now makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court is of the opinion that the Motion for 
Determination of Standing and Interest of Tracy S. Southwick in 
the the Estate of Catherine J. Leone formerly Catherine J. 
Southwick should be granted and the Court finds that Tracy L. 
Southwick has no interest in the estate of Catherine J. Leone. 
Further the Court finds that an order nunc pro tunc should be 
entered allowing the conservators the right to change the 
00224 
CATHERINE SOUTHWICK ESTATE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
beneficiaries on the life estate of Catherine J. Leone and to 
name as beneficiaries thereunder Catherine Kristine Montoya the 
decedant's only daughter or alternatively to name the daughter 
and Gilda Leone the decedant7s mother as joint beneficiaries. 
The Court futher is of the opinion that the Conservators7 Annual 
Accounting as filed should be approved. The Court is further of 
the opinion that the conservators7 Motion for Protective Order 
should be granted. The reason for granting the protective order 
is based upon the granting of the above mentioned motions which 
in effect make the further discovery moot and not required. The 
basis for the decisions herein are as set forth in the 
Memorandum in Support of the Co-Conservators7 and Co-Guardians7 
motions and the Response Memorandum as filed by said 
Co-Conservators7 and Co-Guardians. 
Counsel for the Co-Conservators and Co-Guardians will 
prepare an appropriate ojrder and judgment. 
DATED this / U? day of July, 1991. 
00225 
CATHERINE SOUTHWICK ESTATE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this day of July, 1991: 
William R. Hadley 
KUNZ, KUNZ & HADLEY 
Attorney for Co-Conservators & Co-Guardians 
2225 East Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841117 
Charles Schultz 
GUSTAVSON, SCHULTZ, HALL & WILLIAMS 
225 North State Street 




Order of Judge Moffat 
dated July 31,1991 
m$& vw 
William R. Hadley #5282 
Attorney for Leone Family 
KUNZ, KUNZ & HADLEY 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
2225 E. MURRAY HOLLADAY RD. 
SUITE 204 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 7 
TELEPHONE: 2 7 7 - 4 2 9 2 
JUL 3 1 1391 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
GUARDIANSHIP/CONSERVATORSHIP OF 
CATHERINE J. LEONE, AKA 
CATHERINE L. SOUTHWICK, 
a protected person. 
ORDER 
Case No. 873901223 GC 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
This Court having read The Co-conservators' Motion and 
Memorandum for a Protective Order to stay or suspend all discovery 
in the above-referenced case, the Co-Conservators' Memorandum in 
Support of its Motions for Determination of Interest and Standing 
of Tracy L. Southwick in the Estate of Catherine J. Leone, Order 
Nunc Pro Tunc, and Approval of Annual Accounting, the Memoradums 
in Opposition to the above-motions as filed by Charles A. Schultz, 
attorney of record for Tracy L. Southwick, and the Co-Conservators' 
Reply Memorandums thereto and all pleadings and exhibits on file, 
and this Court being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Tracy L. Southwick, the ex-husband and ex-guardian 
of the above-named protected person, has no interest or standing 
00227 
CATHERINE J. LEONE 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO. 
to file a claim against the estate of Catherine J. Leone, AKA 
Catherine L. Southwick. 
2. That an Order Nunc Pro Tunc shall issue from this Court 
allowing the Conservators the right to change the beneficiaries on 
the life insurance policy as held by Catherine J. Leone on the date 
of her Isath, and to name as beneficiaries thereunder, Catherine 
Kristine Montoya, the decedent's only daughter, and Gilda Leone, 
the decedent's mother as joint beneficiaries upon said insurance 
policy, 
3. That the Co-Conservators annual accounting as filed is 
approved. 
4. That the Co-Conservators1 Motion for Protective Order 
against answering any further discovery is granted as any further 
KUNZ, KUNZ, 6i HADLEY 00228 
ADDENDUM H 
Order Nunc Pro Tunc of Judge Moffat 
dated July 31,1991 
William R. Hadley #5282 
Attorney for Leone Family 
KUNZ, KUNZ & HADLEY 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
2 2 2 5 E. MURRAY HOLLADAY R D . 
S U I T E 2 0 4 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 7 
T E L E P H O N E : 2 7 7 - 4 2 9 2 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 3 1 1991 
By-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
GUARDIANSHIP/CONSERVATORSHIP OF 
CATHERINE J. LEONE, AKA 
CATHERINE L. SOUTHWICK, 
a protected person. 
ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC 
Case No. 873901223GC 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The Court having considered the Co-Conservators1 Motion for 
an Order Nunc Pro Tunc wherein the Co-Conservators requested an 
order relating back to February 1, 1990, wherein a Co-Conservator, 
Frank L. Leone, filed a Change of Beneficiary form upon a Travelers 
Life Insurance policy owned by the above-named protected person, 
and said Change of Beneficiary was denied by Travelers Insurance 
without an Order from this Court allowing such action, and the 
Court having considered the above Motion and supporting Memorandum 
and the Opposition Memorandum filed by Charles A. Schultz, attorney 
of record for Tracy L. Southwick, and all pleadings and exhibits 
on file, and the court being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 75-5-4 08 this Court 
finds that it is in the best interests of the estate of the above-
named protected person to allow the Co-Conservators to file a 
0G2?9 
CATHERINE J. LEONE 
ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC 
PAGE TWO. 
Change of Beneficiary form with the Travelers Insurance Company 
upon a life insurance policy held in the name of the above-named 
protected person and to naiae as joint beneficiaries upon said life 
insurance policy Catherine Kristine Montoya, the decedentfs only 
daughter, and Gilda Leone, ±he decedentfs mother, 
DATED this 3L day of 
District /Cou 
1991, 
KUNZ, KUNZ, 6t HADLEY 00230 
ADDENDUM I 
Minute Order of Judge Moffat 
dated May 12,1992 
Third Judicial DI~Tict 
William R. Hadley #5282 
Attorney for Co-Conservators 
KUNZ, KUNZ & HADLEY 
MAY 1 2 1992 
SALT LAKE GGUN" 
A T T O R N E Y S AT L A W 
2 2 2 5 E. MURRAY HOLLADAY RD. 
SUITE 2 0 4 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 7 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
CATHERINE J. LEONE, AKA CATHERINE 
L. SOUTHWICK, 
An Incapacitated Person. 
ORDER 
Probate No. 873901223 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
That it appearing upon Co-Conservators Motion for a Waiver 
of Annual Accounting for the term from January 9, 1991 until 
January 9, 1992, and it appearing there be no objections to said 
Motion, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
That the annual accounting for the above-entitled estate for 
the term January 9, 1991, to January 9, 1992, shall be waived in 
this matter. jf 
DATED this day of 
ESTATE OF CATHERINE J. LEONE 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING | 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order to the following: Charles A. 
Schultz, Attorney for Tracy Southwick, 345 East 400 South, Suite 
101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Hans Scheffler, Attorney for 
Kristine Montoya, 311 So. State Street, Suite, 380, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. j 
i 
DATED this 8th day of May, 1992. j 
Secretary f"1 1; 
William R. Hadley, #5282 
Attorney for Co-Conservators 
KUNZ, KUNZ & HADLEY 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Rd., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
801-277-4292 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE : CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
GUARDIANSHIP/CONSERVATORSHIP 
OF CATHERINE J. LEONE, AKA : 
CATHERINE L. SOUTHWICK, 
: Case No. 873901223 GC 
A Protected Person. 
: Judge Richard H. Moffat 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the Minute Order to the following: Charles A. 
Schutz, Attorney for Tracy Southwick, 345 East 400 South, Suite 
101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Hans Scheffler, Attorney for 
Kristine Montoya, 311 So. State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
DATED this 8th day of May, 1992. 
Secretary /\ 
Third JiiCilcl*! D:~v,'ct 
#204 
By. 
MAY 1 2 1992 
SALT I.AKE CGOMTY 
D' i j j jJy 
ADDENDUM J 
Memorandum Decision of Judge Rokich 
dated September 27,1994 
9y-
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 1 Wh 
OeputyCterk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
CATHERINE SOUTHWICK, 
A protected person. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 873901223 
This case was tried August 5, 1994. Plaintiffs, the Estate of 
Catherine Southwick, Sam and Frank Leone as co-conservators, were 
represented by William R. Hadley. Tracy Southwick was represented 
by Charles Schultz. Christine Montoya was represented by Hans 
Scheffler. 
The Court heard oral testimony, admitted documentary evidence 
and at the conclusion of the trial took the matter under 
advisement. 
This case resulted from the creation of a pay-on-death account 
wherein Mr. Southwick and Catherine Montoya were designated as the 
pay-on-death beneficiaries. The monies to fund the pay-on-death 
account were those of Catherine Southwick. 
At the time the pay-on-death account was created a stipulation 
was entered into wherein the pay-on-death account was to be used to 
pay the medical expenses and other expenses incurred for Catherine 
Southwick's necessary support and maintenance. 
SOUTHWICK ESTATE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Since Catherine Southwick was comatose, Mr. Southwick was 
appointed conservator of her estate. He subsequently resigned. 
Sam and Frank Leone were appointed as co-conservator of Catherine 
Southwick's estate. 
Upon the death of Catherine Southwick, the co-conservators 
denied Mr. Southwick's claim for his share of the pay-on-death 
account. Judge Moffat sustained the co-conservator's decision. 
Pursuant to Judge Moffat's decision, the co-conservators paid over 
funds from the pay-on-death account to Catherine Montoya, the 
daughter of Catherine Southwick. 
The issues presented to the Court were as follows: 
1. Are the co-conservators personally liable to pay Mr. 
Southwick from the pay-on-death account? 
2. What are the legitimate expenses that should be paid from 
the pay-on-death account? 
3. What amount of the pay-on-death account is Mr. Southwick 
entitled to be paid? 
The Court finds that the co-conservators are not personally 
liable to Mr. Southwick. The co-conservators paid the funds to 
Catherine Montoya pursuant to Judge Moffat's ruling. 
SOUTHWICK ESTATE PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court finds that the legitimate expenses are as follows: 
(a) Burial plot $ 1,020.00 
(b) Burial expenses 5,522.00 
(c) Medical expenses 1,702.41 
(d) Co-conservator fees 5,00.00 
(e) Television & antenna 1,035.31 
(f) Court costs 180.93 
Total $14,460.65 
4. The Court finds that the following are not the legitimate 
expenses incurred for Katherine Southwick: 
Attorney Arnie Richer $ 59.00 
Lewis: Lehman-Attorney name change 429.68 
Personal belongings moving expense 50.00 
Personal belongings moving expense 50.00 
Family lunch for burial plans 34.20 
Cash for church burial needs 550.00 
Pallbearers keepsakes 33.89 
Pallbearers incidentals 38.25 
Memorial lunch for family & visitors 275.00 
Bills for clothing (miscellaneous) 250.00 
Estate settlement 27.96 
Billing for secretarial service 324.75 
One-half fee reimbursement for 
Attorney Sciumbato 250.00 
One-half fee reimbursement for 
Attorney Sciumbato 250.00 
Attorney retainer fee Montoya 500.00 
Attorney retainer fee Leone 500.00 
Total $ 3,622.73 
The Court finds that Mr. Southwick's share of the pay-on-death 
account should be computed as follows if the Court does not award 
attorney fees to Mr. Hadley: 
SOUTHWICK ESTATE PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Receipts $62,135.44 
Expenses 14,4 60.00 
Claim of State of Utah 7,000.00 
Total $40,675.44 
One-half to Mr. Southwick $20,337.24, together with interest 
from Catherine Southwick's death. 
The Court concludes as follows: 
1. Mr. Southwick should have Judgment against the co-
conservators, Frank and Sam Leone, personally, for $1,811.50 which 
represents one-half of the non-legitimate expenses paid out of the 
pay-on-death account, together with interest from the date of 
Catherine Southwick's death. 
2. Mr. Southwick should have Judgment against Catherine 
Montoya for $20,337.24, together with interest from the date of 
Catherine Southwick's death. If the Court awards attorney fees to 
Mr. Hadley, the amount of the Judgment will be reduced accordingly. 
3. The issue of attorney fees is reserved for further 
consideration by the Court. 
4. Upon Mr. Hadley filing an Affidavit for an award of 
attorney fees and opposing counsel having a reasonable time to 
object, the Court will enter its ruling and Judgment can be 
entered. 
SOUTHWICK ESTATE PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Mr- Schultz shall prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and a Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Decision and 
the Court's ruling on attorney fees. 
Dated this ^ / day of September, 1994. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
&LSTRICT COURT JUDGE 
SOUTHWICK ESTATE PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this Jl*7 day of 
September, 1994: 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Tracy Southwick 
P.O. Box 1516 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
William R. Hadley 
Attorney for Sam and Frank Leone 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Hans M. Scheffler 
Attorney for Christine Montoya 
311 S. State, Suite 380 




Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law of 
Judge Bohling dated May 19,1995 
Charles A. Schultz, (4760) 
Attorney for Tracy Southwick HUB BSSUSS? C83ST 
P.O. Box 526382 T h i r d Judicial District 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
CATHERINE SOUTHWICK, a 
protected person. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Probate No. 873901223 
Judge: William B. Bohling 
—oooOooo— 
This case came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge 
John A. Rokich on August 5, 1994, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., on 
Tracy Southwickfs request for a determination of his share of the 
P.O.D. Account established for the care of Mrs. Southwick. The 
Utah Court of Appeals had previously ruled that Mr. Southwick is 
entitled to one-half of the P.O.D. Account. 
Mr. Southwick was not present at the Hearing but was 
represented by his attorney of record Charles A. Schultz. 
Catherine Montoya was not present at the hearing but was 
represented by her attorney of record Hans Scheffler. Frank and 
Sam Leone were present at the hearing and were represented by 
James Lewis. William Hadley was present at the Hearing 
representing the Estate of Catherine Southwick. 
The issues present to the Court at the Hearing were*as 
follows: 
1. Are the co-conservators personally liable to pay Mr. 
Southwick from the pay-on-death account? 
2. What are the legitimate expenses that should be paid 
from the pay-on-death account? 
3. What amount of the pay-on-death account is Mr. 
Southwick entitled to be paid? 
The Court heard oral testimony, admitted documentary 
evidence and at the conclusion of the trial took the matter under 
advisement. Having reviewed the evidence in this matter and now 
being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby enters the 
following Finding of Facts and Conclusion of Law. 
A subsequent hearing was held before the Honorable Judge 
William B. Bohling on February 6, 1995, concerning the objections 
and motions filed by the various parties to the case with respect 
to Judge Rokich's Memorandum Decision, and the Court also heard 
and ruled on Mr. Hadley's request for attorney's fees. 
2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This case resulted from the creation of a pay-on-death 
account wherein Mr. Southwick and Catherine Montoya were 
designated as the pay-on-death beneficiaries. 
2. The monies to fund the pay-on-death account were those 
of Catherine Southwick. 
3. At the time the pay-on-death account was created a 
stipulation was entered into wherein the pay-on-death account was 
to be used to pay the medical expenses and other expenses 
incurred for Catherine Southwick1s necessary support and 
maintenance. 
4. Because Catherine Southwick was comatose, Mr. Southwick 
was appointed conservator of her estate. 
5. He subsequently resigned. 
6. Sam and Frank Leone were appointed as co-conservators 
of Catherine's estate. 
7. After Mrs. Southwick's death, the Leones denied Mr. 
Southwickfs claim for his share of the pay-on-death account. 
8. Judge Moffat sustained the Leones1 decision. 
9. Pursuant to Judge Moffat's decision, the Leones paid 
over the funds from the pay-on-death account to Catherine 
Montoya, the daughter of Mrs. Southwick. 
3 
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10. The Court finds that the legitimate expenses are as 
follows: 
(a) Burial plot $1,020.00 
(b) Burial expenses $5,522.00 
(c) Medical expenses $1,702.41 
(d) Co-conservator fees $5,000.00 
(e) Television & antenna $1,035.31 
(f) Court costs $180.93 
Total $14,460.65 
11. The Court finds that the following are not legitimate 
expenses incurred for Mrs. Southwick. 
Attorney Arnie Richer $59.00 
Lewis: Lehman Attorney name change $429.68 
Personal belongings moving expense $50.00 
Personal belongings moving expense $50.00 
Family lunch for burial plans $34.20 
Cash for church burial needs $550.00 
Pallbearers keepsakes $33.89 
Pallbearers incidentals $38.25 
Memorial lunch for family & visitors $275.00 
Bills for clothing (miscellaneous) $250.00 
Estate settlement $27.96 
Billing for secretarial service $324.75 
One-half fee reimbursement for 
Attorney Scimbato $250.00 
One-half fee reimbursement for 
Attorney Scimbato $250.00 
Attorney retainer fee Montoya $500.00 
Attorney retainer fee Leone $500.00 
Total $3,622.73 
12. The Court concludes that Mr. Southwickfs share of the 
pay-on-death account should be computed as follows: 
Receipts $62,135.44 
4 
Expenses <$14, 460 .00> 
Claim of S t a t e of Utah < $ 7 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 > 
T o t a l $ 4 0 , 6 7 5 . 4 4 
O n e - h a l f ( 1 / 2 ) of $ 4 0 , 6 7 5 . 4 4 : $ 2 0 , 3 3 7 . 7 2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the Leones are not personally 
liable to Mr. Southwick for the money they transferred to Ms. 
Montoya. 
2. The Court concludes that Mr. Southwick should have 
judgment against the Leones in the amount of $1,811.50 which 
represents one-half of the non-legitimate expenses paid out of 
the pay-on-death account. 
3. The Court concludes that Mr. Southwick should recover 
pre-judgment interest on the referenced $1,811.50 at the rate of 
10% from the date of Mrs. Southwick's death through the date of 
judgment. 
4. The Court concludes that Mr. Southwick should have 
judgment against Catherine Montoya in the amount of $20,337.72, 
together with interest on the referenced $2 0,3 37.72 at the rate 
of 10% from the date of Mrs. Southwickfs death through the date 
of judgment. 
5. The Court concludes that the should Tracy Southwick be 
5 
successful on his appeal and if Frank and Sam Leone be found to 
be personally liable for Mr. Southwick's Judgment beyond the 
$1,811.50 specified in paragraph No. 2, the Estate of Catherine 
Leone shall be entitled to a judgment against Catherine Montoya 
for the amount of any judgment entered against Frank and Sam 
Leone personally. 
6. The Court concludes as a matter of law that Mr. Hadley 
is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for the reasons 
that the Leones' conservatorship ended at the time of Mrs. 
Southwick's death, and, therefore, the Leones had no authority to 
employ Mr. Hadley as counsel for Mrs. Southwick's estate. The 
Court further concludes, as a matter of law, that Mr. Hadley's 
request for attorney's fees was untimely filed and, therefore, is 
barred by the statute of limitations for making claims against 
Mrs. Southwick's estate. 
Dated t h i s L_ day of Apri l , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
M L n y ^ R B O T L l N G 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE-
0 0 0 6 9 9 
